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ABSTRACT




With the ever-increasingly connected mobile devices, demand for mobile broadband
service is likely to outstrip spectrum capacity in the near-term. Without action to
address this spectrum crisis, service quality is likely to suffer and prices are likely to
rise. Fortunately, recent studies show that a large part of licensed spectrum remains
under-utilized, which should allow concepts such as dynamic spectrum access/sharing,
open access, and secondary (spot or short-term) spectrum market to alleviate the
crisis.
From the inception of the open access paradigm, it was clear that for it to work
two issues must be adequately addressed: sensing and pricing. The first refers to the
ability of a (secondary) device to accurately detect channel opportunity and more
generally to acquire information on the spectrum environment. The second refers to
mechanisms that provide license holders with the right incentives so that they will
willingly allow access by unlicensed devices. In this thesis we examine both issues but
in ways that are distinctly different from most of what has been done in the literature.
For the pricing issue, we formulate a contract design problem where a primary
license holder wishes to profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it to po-
x
tential secondary users. It needs to determine how to optimally price the excess
spectrum so as to maximize its profit, knowing that this excess capacity is stochastic
in nature, does not come with exclusive access, and cannot provide deterministic ser-
vice guarantees to a buyer. We adopt as a reference a traditional spectrum market
where the buyer can purchase exclusive access with fixed/deterministic guarantees.
We fully characterize the optimal solution in the cases where there is a single buyer
type, and construct an algorithm that generates a set of contracts in the general
case. When multiple primary holders exist, we develop a price competition model
for the license holders selling on a secondary spectrum market. Standard results sug-
gest that under full competition the equilibrium only exists when all sellers have zero
profit. We introduce a regulator which can also be thought of as the sellers forming a
coalition, whose role is to enable money transfer based on partial observations of the
sellers’ actions. We show that by proper design of the transfer mechanism, efficient
equilibrium (profit-maximizing) can be achieved.
On the sensing front, a good channel model can greatly enhance the the ability of
secondary devices to quickly detect spectrum availability and exploit instantaneous
spectrum opportunities. We propose a spectrum utilization model which uses stochas-
tic differential equations (SDE) to model dynamic scattering and multipath fading
channels, in particular, Rayleigh-distributed stationary channels. The SDE model is
in closed form, can generate spectrum dynamics as a temporal process, and is shown
to provide very good fit for real spectrum measurement data. We show how synthetic
spectrum data can be generated in a straightforward manner using this model to





The first 1G service was launched in early 1980. In the two decades that followed
(1990-2010) the worldwide mobile phone subscription grew from 12.4 million to over
4.6 billion [59]. Recent studies predict that the demand for mobile broadband - driven
by devices like smart phones, such as the iPhone and Google’s Android, and by newly
connected devices, like the iPad and Amazon’s Kindle, will increase 13-fold between
2012 and 2017 [17], with more than 10 billion mobile-connected devices by then.
With the ever-increasingly connected mobile devices, demand for mobile broad-
band service is likely to outstrip spectrum capacity in the near-term. Without action
to address this spectrum crisis, service quality is likely to suffer and prices are likely
to rise. Fortunately, recent studies show that a large part of licensed spectrum remain
under-utilized: for instance, on average only about 5.2% of the available spectrum
from 30MHz to 3GHz was being used at any given time in New York City, and the
peak usage was only 13% [20]. A reasonable conjecture therefore is that unlicensed
access of idle (but licensed) spectrum bands, commonly referred to as secondary spec-
trum access, would avert the impending crisis at least in the new-term. This idea
has led to extensive research and development in recent years in such concepts as
dynamic spectrum access/sharing, open access, and secondary (spot or short-term)
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spectrum market, see e.g., [5, 12].
1.2 Challenges
From the inception of the open access paradigm, it was clear that for it to work
two issues must be adequately addressed: pricing and sensing. The first refers to
mechanisms that provide license holders with the right incentives so that they may
willingly allow access by unlicensed devices. The second refers to the ability of a
(secondary) device to accurately detect channel opportunity and, more generally,
to acquire information on the spectrum environment. These two aspects and the
associated challenges are elaborated below.
Pricing The vision of large-scale secondary spectrum access will not be realized
only through the availability of the enabling technology and the regulatory progress:
secondary access cannot be merely rendered as a regulatory compulsion or even so-
cially desirable, but must also be profitable for the license holders. It is unlikely that
the FCC will compel the license holders to allow secondary access, but it can establish
policies to incentivize such cooperation [60], such as creating a secondary spectrum
market on which secondary users may lease or purchase spectrum usage from primary
license holders.
In this scenario, the goods being traded is the excess capacity of the license holder.
Note that the excess capacity is stochastic in nature, does not come with exclusive
access, and cannot provide deterministic service guarantees to a buyer. Any incen-
tive mechanism much be able to establish the benefit of purchasing non-guaranteed
secondary spectrum. The competition among license holders must also be addressed;
otherwise, the secondary market may be inefficient and the profit of the license holders
might collapse to zero.
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Sensing Communications over wireless media is generally much more error prone
compared to their wireline counterparts due to the noisier, time-varying and often
unpredictable nature of the wireless channel quality. Consequently, the modeling of
error patterns in wireless communication has been an important tool for evaluating
the performance of wireless communication and networking algorithms, both in anal-
ysis and in simulation. Research in recent years on dynamic (and open) spectrum
access using cognitive radios (CR) [38] has further exemplified the importance of
channel modeling: the ability of wireless devices to quickly detect spectrum avail-
ability and exploit instantaneous spectrum opportunities is greatly enhanced if they
are equipped with a good channel model that accurately captures the stochastic be-
havior of the underlying channel conditions. This is reflected in our ability to derive
better channel sensing and access decisions both in theory and in numerical exper-
iment when good channels models are available. For this reason the sensing aspect
of secondary spectrum access is also simultaneously treated the same as the channel
modeling aspect.
Coupling between pricing and sensing While it may appear that channel mod-
eling and pricing are two separate issues, they are actually closely connected. From
the seller’s point of view, in order to price the spectrum product appropriately they
need to provide a good characterization of their own channel. Without an accurate
description of the spectrum product, the price of the product cannot be justified be-
cause a buyer will not be able to determine whether the channel satisfies their needs.
A precise description of the secondary spectrum product provided by the seller will
enable the buyer to accurately calculate the amount needed to purchase, which in-
creases the incentive of the buyer to participate in the secondary spectrum market.
Thus, an accurate channel model will lead to accurate pricing which strengthens the
incentives of both the primaries and the secondaries to participate in the secondary
3
spectrum market.
1.3 Our Approach in Relation to Prior Work
Our assumption on the relation between the primary and secondary users can
be classified in the hierarchical access model under the spectrum overlay model as
described in [75]. In the hierarchical access structure, the primary users (licensees)
open licensed spectrum to secondary users while limiting the interference perceived by
primary users. Under the spectrum overlay model, the secondary users are restricted
in when and where they can emit power. For example, the secondary users may
only transmit when there exists a temporal white space in the spectrum. Under the
limiting constraint, the primary users does not see the existence of the secondary users
and its transmission quality is not affected at all. In this sense, when participating the
secondary users absorb the entire risk of shared access, that os having non-guaranteed
transmission service due to the strict constraint on transmission rights.
1.3.1 Contract Framework for Spectrum Market
There has been a number of mechanisms proposed to address the incentive issue,
the most often used being the auction mechanism, see e.g., [70, 31, 40]. Auction
is also the primary mechanism used in allocating spectrum on the primary market
[35]. Under an auction, competing buyers submit bids to a license holder to obtain
spectrum access. In selecting winning bids an auction can be designed to maximize the
profit of the license holder [31], or to maximize social welfare [40], or some combination
of both [31].
In this thesis we consider an alternative approach, that is based on contracts
(posted price), to the trading of spectrum access on the secondary market. This
is conceptually like the design of pricing plans by a cellular operator: it presents a
potential user with a set of contract options, each consisting of parameters including
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the duration of the contract, discount on the device, number of free minutes per
month, price per minute for those over the free limit, window of unlimited calling
time, and so on. In coming up with these calling plans the operator typically studies
carefully the types of callers it wants to attract and their calling patterns/habits; the
subsequent plans are catered to these patterns with the objective of maximizing its
revenue. A caller interested in entering into contract with the operator is expected
to look through these plans and pick one that is the best suited for him/her needs.
Posted price focuses less on the competition among buyers, but more on the de-
signs of products and prices on the part of the license holder to attract potential
buyers. While the two mechanisms (auction and posted price) have been shown to
generate equal profit under ideal conditions [58], they are suitable for different sce-
narios in general. The inherent cost of auction comes from setting up each individual
auction. The processing of the bids, the wait time for the auction to end are all per
auction-based additional costs to the seller [74]. On the contrary, posted price or con-
tract is considered to have a one time cost related to the determination of the efficient
price. This requires thorough understanding of the market which can take time and
money to investigate [69]. The efficient price can be very hard to determine if the
item is rare or the potential buyers are hard to identify. Not surprisingly, auction is
suitable when the items are rare and the unit price is high. When the seller has a
large quantity of identical items, posted price is the better option. As more and more
license holders become interested in the secondary market trading smaller quantities
for shorter duration of time compared to the primary wholesale market, we believe
pricing schemes like the contracts studied in this paper offer a valid alternative to
spectrum auctions.
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1.3.2 Price Competition in Spectrum Market
As more and more license holders participate in the secondary market trading,
price competition between the license holders is inevitable. When the license holders
are competing against each other, the profit each license holder receives will be less
than that from a monopoly market. However, this competition relationship in the
secondary spectrum market is rarely discussed in the literature. When considering
competition in markets, the often used models are the Bertrand and Cournot com-
petition models. The Bertrand model shows that with just two sellers, the market
reaches perfect competition and both sellers sell at marginal price. In the Cournot
model, the results also show that the price approaches marginal price as the number
of seller increases. In the real world, it is unlikely that any firm will sell at their
marginal price. Modification of these two models aim to reflect the real market.
For example, Bertrand-Edgeworth model assumes a production limit of firms in the
Bertrand model. Various other factors can be incorporated in the model to avoid com-
plete competition such as product differentiation, transport and search costs. The
companies can also avoid competing with each other by colluding/side contracting.
1.3.3 Modeling of Spectrum Utilization
The desire to better understand spectrum utilization, especially in the presence
of licensed primary users, has motivated a series of spectrum measurement studies
published recently, see e.g., [56, 55, 41, 16]. These measurement studies, however,
have not in general led to tools that can generate realistic spectrum utilization as a
time process to evaluate spectrum sensing and access algorithms. In [52] a sequence
of probability distributions of spectrum availability were derived using measurement
data. However, these distributions capture only the average behavior of spectrum
rather than describing spectrum activity as a process in time. Our goal in this dis-
sertation is to construct stochastic models that can capture key properties of wireless
6
channels that are important in evaluating opportunistic spectrum access schemes.
1.3.4 Portfolio Optimization of Secondary Spectrum
When multiple secondary spectrum are available in the market, the buyer may
be able to combine multiple purchases of stochastic spectrum products to increase
the quality of transmission, by taking into account the second order statistics of the
spectrum products. In this thesis, we consider a buyer who purchases a portfolio of
spectrum products to maximize the mean throughput while minimizing the variation
of transmission throughput. Although secondary spectrum products, taken sepa-
rately are unreliable and non-guaranteed, the combined quality may be significantly
improved. The pricing can be dynamic depending on the dynamics of the quality of
the secondary spectrum. The buyer in turn decides on the portfolio based on the
instantaneous pricing and channel quality. In this case an accurate channel model
becomes important for both the seller and the buyer so as to have good pricing and
purchasing choices. Work most related to this includes [57], where they consider two
possible metrics, the demand satisfaction rate constraint and the demand satisfaction
probability constraint. We use the Sharpe ratio metric similar to [2] and extend the
buyer’s consideration problem to include pricing.
1.4 Overview of the Thesis and Main Contributions
In this section, we list the main contributions of this thesis.
• Contract Framework for Secondary Spectrum Market
– We proposed a contract design framework where a primary license holder
wishes to profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it to potential
secondary users/buyers via designing a set of profitable contracts. We
completely characterize the optimal solution in the cases where there is
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a single buyer type, and when multiple types of buyers share a common,
known channel condition. In the case when each type of buyers have
different channel conditions we construct an algorithm that generates a
set of contracts in a computationally efficient manner, and show that this
set is optimal when the buyer types satisfy a monotonicity condition.
– We generalize the contract design problem to a more general framework.
The cost function of the buyer can be any function that is increasing in the
money spent, while the quality constraint can be any function that can be
mapped to the additional reference spectrum needed. The utility of the
seller can be any form that is increasing in the price per bandwidth. We
characterize the optimal solution where there is a single buyer type. In
the case when more than one buyer types exist, we construct an algorithm
that generates a set of contracts in a computationally efficient manner, and
show that this set is optimal in the discretized grid when the buyer types
satisfy a monotonicity condition.
• Price Competition in Secondary Spectrum Market
– We introduce a competition model suitable for the secondary spectrum
market. The model is a oligopoly model with multiple sellers competing
in multiple markets. We first show that the market will result in full
competition where equilibrium only exists when all sellers have zero profit.
We then introduce a regulator who can facilitate a set of money transfer
based on partial observations of the sellers actions. We show that by the
introduction of this regulator, we can induce the market to have efficient
(profit maximizing) equilibria. The conditions for designing a stable money
transfer were characterized for cases of two-seller and multiple-seller cases,
and how to achieve fair profit share is also discussed.
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• Secondary Spectrum Utilization Model
– We derive a stochastic differential equation (SDE) model to describe the
secondary wireless channel power. We introduce a method to fit the SDE
model to real spectrum measurement data and show that the SDE model
represents the data very well under different measurement regimes. The
SDE model can be used to generate synthesized sample paths whose en-
tropy measure is consistent with the original measurement data. While we
show that the 2-state GE model is a good choice when binary represen-
tation of the channel condition is sufficient, the SDE model is in general
much more accurate and easier to use than an N -state model because we
can derive an N -state model from the SDE model.
• A Portfolio Framework for Dynamic Channel Models
– We consider buyers combine multiple secondary spectrum purchases (spec-
trum portfolio) to obtain better transmission quality. The quality is char-
acterized by both the total transmission throughput and the variation of
the total throughput. We first solve the buyer’s problem of choosing the
optimal spectrum portfolio under a budget constraint. Next, we introduce
a reference market which sells guaranteed spectrum service and solve the
buyer’s problem again. Based on the result of the buyer’s consideration,
we find the optimal pricing plan which maximizes the seller’s total rev-
enue. If the seller has a cost per channel, we find the optimal pricing plan
assuming both the cost and the pricing plan are proportional to the mean
throughput on each spectrum channel.
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1.5 Organization of the Thesis
The organization of the thesis is as follows. Profit of the license holder can be
achieved if (1) the buyers have incentives to purchase the secondary spectrum (2) the
competition between license holders result in a profitable market. For the first prob-
lem, we propose two frameworks that utilize guaranteed reference spectrum to show
that buyers have incentive in participating in the secondary spectrum trading (Chap-
ter II, III). For the second problem, we propose a modified Bertrand model to show
the efficiency of the multiple secondary spectrum markets (Chapter IV). For sensing,
we develop a continuous stochastic differential equation (SDE) model as an alterna-
tive to the commonly used channel model, particularly in the context of opportunistic
and dynamic spectrum access (Chapter V). For connecting pricing frameworks with
channel modeling, we propose a portfolio spectrum framework where the buyer dy-




Trading Secondary Spectrum Through Contract
Design
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider an approach based on contracts, to the trading of
spectrum access on the secondary market (see Section 2.7.4 on a discussion comparing
the two mechanisms). This is conceptually like the design of pricing plans by a cellular
operator: it presents a potential user with a set of contract options, each consisting
of parameters including the duration of the contract, discount on the device, number
of free minutes per month, price per minute for those over the free limit, window
of unlimited calling time, and so on. In coming up with these calling plans the
operator typically studies carefully the types of callers it wants to attract and their
calling patterns/habits; the subsequent plans are catered to these patterns with the
objective of maximizing its revenue. A caller interested in entering into contract with
the operator is expected to look through these plans and pick one that is the best
suited for him/her needs.
We adopt such a contract design approach in the context of the secondary spec-
trum market, where a license holder advertises a set of prices and service plans in
the hope that a potential buyer will find one of them sufficiently appealing to enter
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into contract. The contracts are designed with the goal of maximizing the expected
revenue of the license holder given a set of buyer types (more precisely defined in the
next section).
To make the contracts appealing to a buyer, one must address the issue that
the spectrum offered on the secondary (short-term) market is typically the excess
capacity due to the primary license holder’s own spectrum under-utilization. Its
quality is therefore often uncontrolled and random, both spatially and temporally,
and strongly dependent on the behavior of the primary users. The primary license
holder can of course choose to eliminate the randomness by setting aside resources
(e.g., bandwidth) exclusively for secondary users. This will however likely impinge on
its current users and may not be in the interest of its primary business model. The
alternative is to simply give non-exclusive access to secondary users for a fee, which
allows the secondary users to share a certain amount of bandwidth simultaneously
with its existing licensed users, but only under certain conditions on the primary
traffic/spectrum usage. For instance, a secondary user is given access but can only use
the bandwidth if the current activity by the licensed users is below a certain level, e.g.,
as measured by received SNR, the so-called spectrum overlay. Many spectrum sharing
schemes proposed in the literature fall under this scenario, see e.g., [47, 50, 76, 4].
In this case a secondary user pays (either in the form of money or services in
return) to gain spectrum access but not for guaranteed use of the spectrum. This
presents a challenge to both the primary and the secondary users: On one hand,
the secondary user must assess its needs and determine whether the uncertainty in
spectrum quality is worth the price asked for and what level of uncertainty can be
tolerated. On the other hand, the primary must decide how stochastic service quality
should be priced so as to remain competitive against guaranteed (or deterministic)
services which the secondary user may be able to purchase from a traditional market
or a different primary license holder.
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To address this challenge we adopt a reference point in the form of a traditional
spectrum market from where a secondary user can purchase guaranteed service, i.e.,
exclusive access rights to certain bandwidth, at a fixed price per unit. This makes it
possible for the secondary user to reject the offer from the primary if it is risk-averse
or if the primary’s offer is not attractive. This also implies that the price per unit of
bandwidth offered by the primary user must reflect its stochastic quality.
Work most relevant to the study presented in this chapter includes [24, 57, 43, 32].
In [24] a contract problem is studied where the secondary users help relay primary
user’s data and in return are allowed to send their own data. In [57] an optimal
portfolio problem is studied, where a secondary user can purchase a bundle of different
stochastic channels, with the price of each already determined, and seeks to find the
optimal purchase. In [43] a network revenue management problem is studied, where
the customers arrive according to a Poisson process and the performance of a class of
certainty-equivalent heuristic control policies was studied. In [32], spectrum trading is
modeled as a monopoly market where the primary determines a price-quality contract.
While our problem setting bears similarity to that considered in [32], there are several
major differences, the chief of which is the fact that our model is not monopolistic
due to the existence of a traditional market (exclusive access) mentioned above, that
serves as a reference for the value of spectrum products offered on the secondary
market (non-exclusive access). In addition, we model different buyer types by their
required bandwidth, service quality and loss tolerance. As a result the types can only
be partially ordered.
Main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
1. We formulate a contract design problem where the spectrum license holder seeks
to sell his excess bandwidth to potential buyers. The model captures the follow-
ing essential features: (1) excess bandwidth on the secondary spectrum market
often comes with non-exclusive use and therefore highly uncertain channel con-
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ditions; (2) incentives are built in for both the seller and the buyer to conduct
spectrum trading on the secondary market.
2. We fully characterize the optimal set of contracts the seller should provide in
the case of a single or two types of buyers, and when multiple types of buyers
share the same channel condition due to primary user activities.
3. When there are multiple types of buyers and each experiences different chan-
nel conditions, we construct a computationally efficient algorithm and show
that the set of contracts it generates is optimal when the buyer types satisfy a
monotonicity condition.
4. When the spectrum holder has limited amount of bandwidth, we discuss three
different scenarios and show how to modify our algorithm accordingly.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We present the contract
design problem in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 characterizes the utility region and the
optimal contract in the single buyer case. Section 2.5 deals with the case when the
channel condition is common knowledge, while Section 2.6 focuses on the case when
channel conditions are private knowledge. Discussion is given in Section 2.7.2, 2.7.4
and 2.7.3 and numerical results in Section 2.8.
2.2 Model and Assumptions
In this section we describe in detail the models for the two parties under the
contract framework: the seller and the buyer, and their considerations in designing
and accepting a contract, respectively. We also illustrate a basic idea underlying
our model to capture the value of secondary spectrum service, which is random and
non-guaranteed in nature, by using guaranteed service as a reference.
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2.2.1 The Seller
There are two parties to a contract, the seller and the buyer. The seller is also
referred to as the owner or the primary license holder, who uses the spectrum to
provide business and service to its primary users, and carry primary traffic. He is
willing to sell underutilized bandwidth he has as long as it generates positive profit
and does not impact negatively his primary business. We will assume that the seller
can pre-design up to M contracts and announce them to potential buyers.
2.2.2 The contract
Each contract is in the form of a pair of real numbers (x, p), where x ∈ R+ and
p ∈ R+.
• x is the amount of bandwidth they agree to trade on (i.e., access to this amount
of bandwidth is given from the seller to buyer).
• p is the price per unit of x; thus a total of xp is paid to the seller if the buyer
purchases this contract.
The seller’s profit or utility from contract (x, p) is given as
U(x, p) = x(p− c)
where c is a predetermined constant that takes into account the operating cost of the
seller. We will assume that any contract the seller presents must be such that p > c;
that is, the seller will not sell at a loss. If none of the contracts is accepted by the
buyer, the reserve utility of the owner is defined by U(0, 0) = 0.
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2.2.3 A reference market of fixed/deterministic service or exclusive use
We next consider what a contract specified by the pair (x, p) means to a potential
buyer. To see this, we will assume that there exists a traditional (as opposed to
this emerging, secondary) market from where the buyer can purchase services with
fixed or deterministic guarantees. What this means is that the buyer can purchase
exclusive use of certain amount of bandwidth, which does not have to be shared with
other (primary) users. This serves as an alternative to the buyer, and is used in
our model as a point of reference. We will not specify how the price of exclusive
use is set, and will simply normalize it to be unit price per unit of bandwidth (or
per unit of transmission rate). The idea is that given this alternative, the seller
cannot arbitrarily set his price because the buyer can always walk away and purchase
from this traditional market. This traditional market will also be referred to as the
reference market, and the service it offers as the fixed or deterministic service. Our
model allows a buyer to purchase from both markets should that be in the interest of
the buyer. Note that even though we have assumed a single seller model, this is not
a monopoly because of the existence of this reference market. However, we do not
explicitly model the competition between multiple sellers on the secondary market,
which remains an interesting subject of future study.
2.2.4 The buyer’s consideration
When the set of M contracts are presented to a buyer, his choices are (1) to
choose one of the contracts and abide by its terms, (2) to reject all contracts and
go to the traditional market, and (3) to purchase a certain combination from both
markets. The buyer’s goal is to minimize his purchasing cost as long as certain quality
constraints are satisfied.
While the framework presented here applies to any meaningful quality constraint,
to make our discussion concrete below we will focus on a loss constraint. Suppose the
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buyer chooses to purchase y units of fixed service from the reference market together
with a contract (x, p). Then its constraint on expected loss of transmission can be
expressed as:
E[(q − y − xB)+] ≤  ,where
• q is the amount of data/traffic the buyer wishes to transmit.
• B ∈ {0, 1} is a binary random variable denoting the quality of the channel for
this buyer. We will denote b := P (B = 1).
•  is a threshold on the expected loss acceptable to the buyer.
• y is the amount of bandwidth the buyer purchases additionally from the refer-
ence market; its price is 1 per unit bandwidth.
Note that quantities x, y and q are of the same unit; this unit can be bit (total
amount of transmission), or rate (bits per second), and so on. Here we have adopted
a simplifying assumption that the purchased service (in the amount of x) is either
available in the full amount (when B = 1) or unavailable (when B = 0), with xb being
the expected availability. If the contract duration is comparable to the time constant
of the primary user activity (e.g., peak vs. off-peak hours) then this model captures
the spectrum condition at the time of contract signing. More sophisticated models
can be adopted here, by replacing xB with another random variable X(x) denoting
the random amount of data transmission the buyer can actually realize. Although the
technical details will become different, the basic ideas are the same. More is discussed
on how to incorporate a general model of B in Chapter III.
With a purchase of (y, (x, p)), the buyer’s cost is given by y + xp. The cost of
the contract (x, p) to this buyer is given by the value of the following minimization
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problem:
C(x, p) = minimize
y
y + xp (2.1)
subject to E[(q − y − xB)+] ≤  (2.2)
That is, to assess how much this contract actually costs him, the buyer has to consider
how much additional fixed service he needs to purchase to fulfill his needs.
The buyer can always choose to not enter into any of the presented contracts and
only purchase from the traditional market. In this case, his cost is given by the value
of the following minimization problem:
C(0, 0) = minimize
y
y, subject to E[(q − y)+] ≤ 
Since every term is deterministic in the above problem, we immediately conclude that
C(0, 0) = q−, which will be referred to as the reserve price of the buyer. It is natural
to assume that any buyer must be such that q ≥ , for otherwise the buyer does not
need to perform any transmission as it can tolerate the loss of all of its data.
In deciding whether to accept a given contract (x, p), the buyer has to consider
(1) whether the contract would satisfy its quality (loss) constraint, and (2) whether
there is an incentive to enter into this contract, i.e., whether the cost of this contract
is no higher than the reserve price. The latter is also referred to as the individual
rationality (IR) constraint, C(x, p) ≤ C(0, 0) = q−. Any contract that satisfies both
constraints of a buyer is referred to as acceptable to that buyer.
If a buyer accepts one of the contracts, the two sides come to an agreement and
have to follow the contract up to a predetermined period of time. We will leave
this duration unspecified as it does not affect our analysis under the current model
assuming the buyer’s need is to transmit a certain amount of data over the entire
contract period. However, the binary channel model would be more reasonable if the
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contract considered is short term.
2.2.5 Buyer types and informational constraints
We will assume that a potential buyer may be one of a number of different types;
each type is characterized by a unique triple (q, , b), which is a buyer’s private infor-
mation. That is, a type is characterized by its transmission needs (amount q to be
transferred and loss requirement ), as well as its perceived spectrum/channel quality
(b). Throughout the chapter we will assume that a type (q, , b) is such that there
exists a contract with p > c acceptable to the buyer, for otherwise the seller has no
incentive to sell.
We will further assume two cases, where b is common to all types and where b
may be different for different types. The first case models the scenario where buyers
are relatively homogeneous and their perceived channel quality is largely determined
by the primary user traffic reflected in b. In this case it is also natural to assume
that b is known to the seller. The second case models the scenario where buyers may
differ significantly in their location, quality of transceiver devices, and so on, which
leads to different perceived channel quality, which is only known to a buyer himself.
The seller is assumed to know the distribution of the buyer types but not the
actual type of a particular buyer. The buyer types and their distribution may be
estimated from the seller’s past experience. Specifically, we will assume there are K
types of buyers, and a buyer is of type i with probability ri and is given by the triple
(qi, bi, i). In subsequent sections we proceed in the following sequence: (1) single
user type, (2) multiple user types; common b, and (3) multiple user types; different
and private b.
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2.3 Optimal contract for a single buyer type
We begin by considering the case where there is only one type of buyer (q, , b).
Through this simplified scenario we will introduce a number of concepts key to our
analysis and obtain some basic understanding of the nature of this problem.
Under our assumption that the seller knows the buyer type distribution, having
a single type (i.e., a singleton distribution) essentially means that the triple (q, , b)
is known to the seller. Denote by T = {(x, p) : C(x, p) ≤ C(0, 0)} the set of all
acceptable contracts for the buyer, or the acceptance region. This is characterized by
the next result.
Theorem 2.1. When q(1− b) ≤ , the buyer accepts a contract (x, p) iff
p ≤





if x > q−
b
. (2.3)
When q(1− b) > , the buyer accepts the contract iff
p ≤








The above theorem can be proved for each of the cases listed above. For brevity
below we only show the proof for the sufficient condition under q(1 − b) ≤  for the
first case in Eqn (2.3); other cases can be done using similar arguments.




Proof. If both the IR constraint and the loss constraint are satisfied under the stated
conditions, then the buyer accepts the contract. Below we check these two constraints.
Let the buyer supplement this contract with an additional purchase of y = q− −xp
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deterministic service. Note that y ≥ 0 under the stated conditions. The total cost of
this contract to the buyer is then given by:
C(x, p) = y + xp = q − − xp+ xp = q −  = C(0, 0).
The IR constraint is therefore satisfied. The buyer’s loss under this combination of
purchases is given by:
E[(q − y − xB)+] = (q − y − x)+b+ (q − y)+(1− b)
= (+ xp− x)+b+ (+ xp)(1− b)
=

(+ xp)(1− b) ≤ (+ b q−
b
)(1− b)
= q(1− b) ≤ , if + x(p− 1) ≤ 0
(+ x(p− 1))b+ (+ xp)(1− b)
= + x(p− b) ≤ , if + x(p− 1) > 0
Thus the loss constraint is also satisfied.
The two acceptance regions given by Theorem 2.1 are illustrated in Figs. 2.1.
Any contract that falls below the boundary is acceptable to the buyer. The two cases
have the following interpretations. In the first case (q(1− b) ≤ ), the quality of the
stochastic channel is sufficiently good such that the loss constraint (3.2) may be met
without any purchase of the deterministic channel. In this case the buyer is willing
to spend up to the entire reserve price C(0, 0) = q−  on the contract. In the second
case (q(1− b) > ), the quality of the stochastic channel is such that no matter how
much is purchased, some deterministic channel is needed (y > 0) in order to satisfy
the loss constraint (note xp ≤ b
1−b < q−  because q(1− b) > ). Consequently, in the
first case, further purchase from the reference market is needed only if the contract
has x < x∗, whereas in the second case, the buyer always has to purchase from the
reference market to satisfy the loss constraint. This observation holds throughout the
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Figure 2.1: The upper curve is when q(1 − b) <  (q = 5, b = 0.8,  = 3), the lower
curve is when q(1− b) >  (q = 5, b = 0.3,  = 3)
chapter including when we introduce multiple buyer types.
For a given buyer type (q, , b), the seller can choose any point in the corresponding
acceptance region T to maximize its utility: max(x,p)∈T U(x, p). We next show that
the optimal contract for the seller is given by the “knee” (the intersection point where
the straight line meets the curve) on the boundary of the acceptance region, denoted
as (x∗, p∗).
Theorem 2.3. The optimal contract for the seller is the intersection point (x∗, p∗)
on the acceptance region boundary of the buyer.
Proof. We prove the optimality in two steps. First we show that the seller’s utility
is strictly increasing in p which implies that the optimal contract must be such that
(2.3) and (2.4) hold with strict equality. Then we show that the intersection point is
strictly better than any other point on the boundary. For any x > 0 and ∀p′ > p, we
have
U(x, p′) = x(p′ − c) > x(p− c) = U(x, p).
Thus U(x, p) is strictly increasing in p. For any x < x∗ (points on the straight line)
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we have
U(x∗, p∗) = x∗(p∗ − c) > x(p∗ − c) = U(x, p∗),
which used the fact that p∗ > c. (Recall we have assumed that for any buyer there
must exist a contract with p > c that it finds acceptable. This implies such a point
must be within the acceptance region, which in turn implies that we must have p∗ > c
since p∗ ≥ p, ∀p in the region.) For any pair (x, p) such that xp = x∗p∗ and x > x∗
(points on the curve),
U(x, p) = x(p− c) = x∗p∗ − xc > x∗(p∗ − c) = U(x∗, p∗).
Thus U(x∗, p∗) is strictly greater than any point U(x, p) on the boundary.
Once the seller determines the optimal contract and presents it to the buyer,
the buyer will accept because it satisfies both the loss and the IR constraints. It
can be easily shown that the buyer’s cost in accepting is exactly C(0, 0). Note that
technically since the cost of the contract is exactly equal to the reserve price, the
buyer is indifferent between getting only deterministic service and getting a mix of
both types of services. In practice the seller can always lower the unit price p∗ by an
arbitrarily small amount to provide a positive incentive so that the buyer will accept
the contract. For this reason even though the costs are equal, for simplicity we will
assume that the buyer will accept this contract. For the same reason, we will also
assume that when there exist multiple contracts of equal cost to the buyer, the seller
can always induce the desired choice from the buyer by introducing a small difference
to the desired contract. We have now a complete characterization of the contract
design for a single type of buyer.
We will now introduce the concept of an equal-cost line of a buyer. Consider a
contract (x′, p′). Denote by P (x′, p′, x) a price such that the contract (x, P (x′, p′ , x))
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Figure 2.2: Example of equal cost lines
has the same cost as contract (x′, p′) to a buyer.
Definition 2.4. The equal-cost line E of a buyer of type (q, , b) is the set of contracts
within the buyer’s acceptance region T that are of equal cost to the buyer. Thus
(x, p) ∈ E if and only if p = P (x′, p′, x) for some other (x′, p′) ∈ E. The cost of this
line is given by C(x′, p′), ∀(x′, p′) ∈ E.
It should be clear that there are many equal-cost lines, each with a different cost.
Figure 2.2 shows an example of a set of equal-cost lines. The next theorem gives a
precise expression for the equivalent price that characterizes an equal-cost line.
Theorem 2.5. For a buyer of type (q, , b) with an intersection point (x∗, p∗) on its
acceptance region boundary, and given a contract (x′, p′), an equal-cost line consists
of all contracts (x, P (x′, p′, x)) such that




(b− p′) if x, x′ ≤ x∗
x′p′/x if x, x′ ≥ x∗
(b(x∗ − x′) + x′p′)/x if x′ < x∗ < x
b− (x∗b− x′p′)/x if x < x∗ < x′
Proof. We will prove this for the case q(1 − b) ≤ ; the other case can be shown
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with similar arguments and is thus omitted for brevity. In this case x∗ = q−
b
. When
x, x′ ≤ x∗, without buying deterministic service the loss is given by
E[(q − xB)+] = (q − x)+b+ q(1− b)
= (q − x)b+ q(1− b) = q − xb ≥ ,
where the second equality is due to the fact that q(1−b) ≤ ⇒ q−
b
≤ q ⇒ x ≤ q−
b
≤
q. The incentive for the buyer is to purchase y such that the loss is just equal to .
E[(q − y − xB)+] = (q − y − x)b+ (q − y)(1− b)
= q − y − xb =  .
The first equality follows from the fact that q(1 − b) ≤ , which implies both (q −
y − x) ≥ 0 and (q − y) ≥ 0. This is true for both (x, p) and (x′, p′). Since (x, p) is
on the equal cost line Ex′,p′ , we know that C(x, p) = C(x
′, p′). We also know that
C(x, p) = y + xp and C(x′, p′) = y′ + x′p′,
C(x, p) = q − − xb+ xp = q − − x′b+ x′p′ = C(x′, p′) .
Rearranging the second equality such that p is a function of x, x′, p′ immediately gives
the result. When x, x′ > x∗, x (x′) alone is sufficient to achieve the loss constraint.
For C(x, p) = C(x′, p′) we must have x′p′ = xp, resulting in the second branch. The
third and fourth branch can be directly derived from the first two branches. When
x > x∗ > x′ (x′ > x∗ < x), we first find the equivalent price at x∗ by the first branch
(second branch), and then use the second branch (first branch) to find P (x′, p′, x).
This gives the third branch (fourth branch)
The form of the equal-cost line is the same regardless whether q(1 − b) ≤  or
q(1 − b) > . Note that every contract below an equal-cost line is strictly preferable
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to a contract on the line for the buyer. This is an observation we will use in subsequent
sections. We end this section with a property of the equivalent price we will use later.
Lemma 2.6. P (x′, p′, x) is strictly increasing in p′ when x′ > 0.
This lemma is easily shown by noting C(x′, p′) = y + x′p′, where y is only a
function of x′. Thus, p > p′ implies C(x′, p) > C(x′, p′) when x′ > 0.
2.4 Multiple buyer types: preliminaries
We now consider K types of buyers indexed by i = 1, 2, · · · , K, each defined by





i ) = argmax(x,p)∈TiU(x, p)
to denote the optimal contract if type i were the only type existing. Similarly, we
will use Ci(x, p) to denote the cost to a type-i buyer for accepting contract (x, p).
A buyer is of type i with probability ri. We assume that the seller knows only
this distribution of types but not the actual type of a given buyer. Consequently it
has to design the contracts in a way that maximizes its expected payoff. Since the
payoff is measured in expectation, it turns out that it does not matter whether the
seller is faced with a single buyer or multiple buyers as long as they are drawn from
the same, known type distribution and the seller has sufficient bandwidth to honor
its contracts. For this reason throughout our discussion we will take the view of a
single buyer drawn from a certain type distribution. In Section 2.7.2 we discuss the
case when the seller has limited bandwidth to trade.
Consider a set of contracts C = {(x1, p1), ..., (xK , pK)} designed by the seller with
the intention that a buyer of type i prefers (xi, pi). This is true iff Ci(xi, pi) ≤
Ci(xj, pj),∀j 6= i. Let Ri(C) denote the contract that a type-i buyer selects given
a set C. Then Ri(C) = argmin(x,p)∈C Ci(x, p) and the seller’s expected utility for a
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given C is E[U(C)] =
∑
i U(Ri(C))ri. Note that there is no point in offering more
than K contracts. In the case of more than K contracts offered, there will always be
a contract not taken by any buyer type.
2.5 Multiple buyer types: Common channel condition
In this section we consider the case where different types share the same channel
condition bi = b, i = 1, · · · , K, which is also known to the seller. As mentioned
earlier, this models the case where the condition is primarily determined by the seller’s
primary user traffic. An example of the acceptance regions of three buyer types are
shown in Figure 2.3. Note that maxi’s need not be ordered in i; however, in the
interest of simplicity in presentation, we will reindex them in ascending order of the
x∗i s for the remainder of this section. There are two possible cases: (1) the seller can
announce as many contracts as he likes (M = K); (2) the seller is limited to at most
M < K contracts. Below we fully characterize the optimal contract set in both cases.













Three buyer types with same channel condition
I2 I3I1
max1 max2 max3
Figure 2.3: Three buyer types with common b
Theorem 2.7. When M = K, the contract set that maximizes the seller’s profit is
(max1,max2, ...,maxK).
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As shown in Figure 2.3, with a constant b, the intersection points of all acceptance
regions are on the same line p = b. For a buyer of type i, all points to the left of
maxi on this line cost the same as maxi, and all points to its right are outside the
buyer’s acceptance region. Therefore the type-i buyer will select the contract maxi
given this contract set (see earlier discussion on how the seller can always incentivize
this contract over others with equal cost). Since this is the best the seller can do with
a type-i buyer (see Theorem 2.5) this set is optimal for the seller. It is also relatively
straightforward to obtain a similar results in the case of M < K given next.
Lemma 2.8. When M < K and ∀bi = b, the optimal contract set is a subset of
(max1, ...,maxK).
Proof. Assume the optimal contract C is not a subset of (max1, ...,maxK). Then it
must consists of some contract points from at least one of the Ii regions as demon-
strated in Figure 2.3. Let these contracts be Ai ⊂ Ii and
⋃
iAi = C. For each
non-empty Ai, we replace it by the contract maxi and call this new contract set C′.
The proof is to show that this contract set generates profit at least as large as the
original one. For each type-i buyer that picked some contract (x, p) ∈ Aj from the
optimal contract C, it must had a type greater than or equal to j otherwise (x, p)
is not in its acceptance region. In the contract set C′, type-i will now pick maxj or
maxl with l > j. The choice of each possible type of buyer picks from C′ is at least as
profitable as the one they picked from C. Thus, the expected profit of C′ is at least
as good as C.
This lemma suggests the following iterative way of finding the optimal contract
set without having to solve what would seem like a combinatorial problem. Define
function g(m, i) as the maximum expected profit for the seller by picking contract
maxi and selecting optimally m− 1 contracts from the set (maxi+1, ...,maxK). Note
that if we include maxi and maxj (i < j) in the contract set but nothing else in
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between i and j, then a buyer of type l (i ≤ l < j) will pick contract maxi. These
types contribute to an expected profit of x∗i (b − c)
∑j−1
l=i rl. At the same time, no
types below i will select maxi (as it is outside their acceptance regions), and no types
at or above j will select maxi (as for them maxj is preferable).
The function g(m, i) can be recursively obtained as follows:
g(m, i) = max
j:i<j≤K−m+2




with the boundary condition g(1, i) = x∗i (b− c)
∑K
l=i rl.
Finally, it should be clear that the maximum expected profit for the seller is given
by max1≤i≤K g(M, i), and the optimal contract set can be determined by going back-
wards: first determine i∗M = arg max1≤i≤K g(M, i), then i
∗
M−1 = arg max1≤i≤K−1 g(M−
1, i), and so on. In computing the set of MK values of g(m, i), we note that each can
be computed in less than K steps if g(m− 1, i), i = 1, ..., K is already known. These
values can therefore be computed in an increasing order, resulting in a complexity of
O(K2M). By comparison a brute force search on K choose M possible contract sets
is exponential.
Theorem 2.9. The set {maxi∗1 ,maxi∗2 , · · · ,maxi∗M} obtained using the above proce-
dure is optimal and its expected profit is given by g(M, i∗M).
2.6 Multiple buyer types: Private channel condition
We now consider multiple buyer types each with a different channel condition bi,
i = 1, · · · , K. We will start with the special case of K = 2 and characterize the
optimal contracts in this case. Using these results we then construct an algorithm to



































Figure 2.4: (left) max1 /∈ T2 and max2 /∈ T1; (right) max1 ∈ T2
2.6.1 Two buyer types: K = 2
Consider two buyer types (qi, i, bi), i = 1, 2, with probability ri, r1 + r2 = 1. We
first consider the case that the seller is limited to one contract: M = 1.
Theorem 2.10. The optimal contract when K = 2 and M = 1 is as follows:
1. If max1 /∈ T2 and max2 /∈ T1,
optimal =

max1 if r1U(max1) ≥ r2U(max2)
and r1U(max1) ≥ U(G)
max2 if r2U(max2) ≥ r1U(max1)
and r2U(max2) ≥ U(G)
G if U(G) ≥ r2U(max2)
and U(G) ≥ r1U(max1)
where G denotes the intersecting point between acceptance region boundaries of
the two types.
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2. If max1 ∈ T2.
optimal =
 max1 if U(max1) ≥ r2U(max2)max2 if r2U(max2) ≥ U(max1)
3. If max2 ∈ T1.
optimal =
 max2 if U(max2) ≥ r1U(max1)max1 if r1U(max1) ≥ U(max2)
The above result is illustrated in Figure 2.4 and can be argued by showing the
profit of every contract in a particular region (such as I1) is no greater than some
specific contract (such as max1). Take the case max1 /∈ T2 and max2 /∈ T1 for
example, any point in I3 is suboptimal to point G because any contract in I3 is
acceptable by both types of buyers, but G has a strictly higher profit than any other
point in I3.
We now consider the case M = 2. We shall see that providing multiple contracts
can help the obtain higher profits.
Theorem 2.11. In the case of M = 2, max1 /∈ T2 and max2 /∈ T1, the optimal
contract set is {max1,max2}.
Proof. The set C = {max1,max2} gives an expected payoff of
E[U(C)] = r1U(R1(C)) + r2U(R2(C)))
= r1U(R1(max1)) + r2U(R2(max2)).
The second equality holds because max1 /∈ T2 and max2 /∈ T1 and thus type i will
pick maxi. Suppose C is not the optimal set of 2 contracts, then there must exists
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some C′ = {(x1, p1), (x2, p2)} such that
E[U((C′))] = r1U(R1(x1, p1)) + r2U(R2(x2, p2))
> E[U(C)]
= r1U(R1(max1)) + r2U(R2(max2))
This implies either U(R1(x1, p1)) > U(R1(max1)), or U(R2(x2, p2)) > U(R2(max2)),
or both, all of which contradict the definition of maxi. Thus, {max1,max2} is the
optimal contract set.
The proof as well as the intuition behind the above result are straightforward.
The next case, M = 2, max1 ∈ T2 or max2 ∈ T1, is more complicated. Without loss
of generality, we will assume that the type-1 buyer has a smaller b1 (b1 ≤ b2), thus
max1 ∈ T2. We first determine the optimal contract when x∗1 ≤ x∗2; this result is then
used for the case when x∗1 > x
∗
2. Without loss of optimality we consider only contract
pairs {(x1, p1), (x2, p2)} where type-i buyer picks (xi, pi) instead of the other one.
To find the optimal contract, we 1) first show that for each (x1, p1) we can express
the optimal (x2, p2) in terms of x1 and p1; 2) then we show that (x1, p1) must be on
the boundary of T1 with x1 ≤ x∗1; 3) using 1) and 2) we optimize the expected profit
over possible choices of x1.
Lemma 2.12. When K = 2, if max1 ∈ T2 and x∗1 ≤ x∗2, then given a contract for
type-1 (x1, p1), the optimal contract for type-2 must be (x
∗
2, P2(x1, p1, x
∗
2)).
Proof. Given a contract (x1, p1), the feasible region for the contract of type-2 buyer
is the area below P2(x1, p1, x) as defined in Theorem 2.5 (see Figure 2.5). Since the
seller’s profit is increasing in both p and x, the contract that generates the highest
profit is at x2 = x
∗
2 and p2 = P2(x1, p1, x
∗
2).
Lemma 2.13. When K = 2, if max1 ∈ T2 and x∗1 ≤ x∗2, an optimal contract for
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) (x1, p1) for type−1
Optimal contract to give type−2
Equal−cost line of type−2
Figure 2.5: The regions to distinguish type-2 given (x1, p1)
type-1 must be p1 = b1 and x1 ≤ x∗1.
Proof. Assume the optimal contract has (x1, p1) ∈ T1 and given some δ > 0 we still
have (x1, p1 + δ) ∈ T1. By noticing that both U(x, p) and P (x, p, x′) are increasing in
p. We know that both U(x1, p1 + δ) and U(x
∗
2, P2(x1, p1 + δ, x
∗
2))) are strictly larger
than U(x1, p1) and U(x
∗
2, P2(x1, p1, x
∗
2))). This contradicts the assumption that it
was optimal before, thus, we know that the optimal contract for (x1, p1) must be on
the two lines (the upper boundary of T1) defined in Theorem 2.1. Then we exclude
the possibility of having optimal contract with x1 > x
∗
1. If x1 > x
∗





1, b1). This will increase the profit from type-1, leaving the profit
from type-2 unchanged.
Using Lemmas 2.12, 2.13 and Theorem 2.5, the expected profit can be expressed
as follows.
E[U(C)] = r1U(x1, p1) + r2U(x2, P2(x1, p1, x∗2))






= r1x1(b1 − c) + r2x∗2(b2 −
x1
x∗2
(b2 − b1)− c)
∂E[U(C)]
∂x1
= r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1)
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The x1 achieving the optimal contract C is given by,
x1 =

0 if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) < 0
x∗1 if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) > 0
C =

{max2} if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) < 0




(b2 − b1))} o.w.
This result shows two operating regimes: 1) When r1
r2
< b2−b1
b1−c , type-2 is more profitable
and the seller will offer max2. In this case there is no way to offer another contract for
type-1 without affecting the behavior of type-2. Consequently, the seller only offers
one contract. 2) When r1
r2
> b2−b1
b1−c , type-1 is more profitable and the seller will offer
max1. After choosing max1, the seller can also choose (x
∗




(b2 − b1)) for the
type-2 buyer without affecting the type-1 buyer’s choice. As a result, the seller offers
a pair of contracts to get the most profit.
The optimal contract for x∗1 > x
∗
2 can be determined with a similar argument.
Again, we can prove that the optimal contract must have p1 = b1 and x1 ≤ x∗1. The
difference is that when x∗1 > x
∗
2, the expression for (x
∗
2, P2(x1, p1, x
∗
2)) has two cases
depending on whether x1 > x
∗





r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) if x1 ≤ x∗2
r1(b1 − c) + r2b1 if x1 > x∗2
To summarize, when r1(b1−c)−r2(b2−b1) > 0, E[R(C)] is strictly increasing in x1 and
we know that x1 = x
∗
1 maximizes the expected profit. When r1(b1−c)−r2(b2−b1) < 0,
E[R(C)] is decreasing in x1 if x1 ∈ [0, x∗2] and increasing in x1 if x1 ∈ [x∗2, x∗1]. We can
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only conclude that either x1 = 0 or x1 = x
∗
1 maximizes the expected profit.
x1 =

0 or x∗1 if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) < 0












)} if r1(b1 − c)− r2(b2 − b1) > 0
In the first condition, we can calculate the expected profit of the two contract sets
and pick the one with the higher profit.
2.6.2 K buyer types, K > 2
The previous section gives the explicit solution to the contract design problem
when K = 2. When K > 2 we no longer have explicit solutions; even numerically
searching for the optimal contract set becomes very complicated. For instance, even
if we assume that both x and p are from discrete sets, with X and P possible values,
respectively, the search must be done over the space of all possible sets of K different
contracts, on the order of (XP )K . In general X and P both take on real values,
making the search space uncountable. In order to reduce the complexity we will need
to exploit special properties of the problem. We first reindex the buyer types such
that b1 ≤ ... ≤ bK . Then under certain conditions we will determine a procedure
which finds the optimal contract. In the remainder of this section, we will assume
the seller can design up to K contracts.
Definition 2.14. The buyer types are said to satisfy a monotonicity condition (MC),
if ∀i, j, bi ≤ bj implies x∗i ≤ x∗j .
Thus when the types are ordered b1 ≤ ... ≤ bK , we have x∗1 ≤ ... ≤ x∗K . This
monotonicity condition (MC) says that the amount a buyer willing to buy is strictly
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increasing in the quality it gets from buying the secondary spectrum. This condition
leads to special properties which allows us to construct simpler ways to find the
optimal contracts.




Case 1. x′ ≤ x∗i ≤ x∗j
When x′ ≤ x∗i ≤ x∗j , both types have equal utiliy line of the same form.
Pi(x


















′, p′, x) ≤ Pj(x′, p′, x) ∀x∗i ≥ x ≥ x′
When x∗i < x < x
∗
j , while Pj(x
′, p′, x) still follows the same formula (Equation. 2.5),
Pi(x
′, p′, x) starts to decrease by following the line Pi(x′, p′, x) = x′Pi(x′, p′, x∗i )/x.
Thus,
Pi(x
′, p′, x) ≤ Pj(x′, p′, x) ∀x∗i ≤ x ≤ x∗j
When x > x∗j , both i, j follow the form P (x
′, p′, x) = P (x′, p′, x∗j)/x. But Pi(x
′, p′, x∗j) ≤
Pj(x
′, p′, x∗j), they never cross and Pj(x
′, p′, x) ≥ Pi(x′, p′, x) ∀x > x∗j .
Case 2. x∗i < x
′ < x∗j
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When x∗i < x
′ < x < x∗j they are of the form,
Pi(x




′, p′, x) = bj − qj − j − Cj(x
′, p′)
x
respectively. By the same argument as in Theorem. 2.16, Pi is decreasing while Pj is
increasing. Thus, Pi(x
′, p′, x∗j) ≤ Pj(x′, p′, x∗j). When x > x∗j ,
Pi(x










′, p′, x∗j) < Pj(x
′, p′, x∗j) we know that Pi(x
′, p′, x) < Pj(x′, p′, x) ∀x > x∗j .
Case 3. x′ > x∗j > x
∗
i
When x > x∗j , both types have equal cost line as xp = x
′p′. Thus, Pi(x′, p′, x) =
Pj(x
′, p′, x) ∀x > x∗j .




Case 1. x′ ≤ x∗i ≤ x∗j
When x′ ≤ x∗i and x′ ≤ x∗j , the equal cost lines for x < x′ are of the form,
Pi(x
′, p′, x) = bi − qi − i − δi
x
Pj(x
′, p′, x) = bj − qj − j − δj
x
where we let δi = Ci(x










= (qj − j − δj)x−2
By definition, Pi(x
′, p′, x′) = p′ = Pj(x′, p′, x′),
p′ = bi − qi − i − δi
x′
= bj − qj − j − δj
x′







, and thus Pi(x
′, p′, x) ≥ Pj(x′, p′, x), ∀x < x′.
Case 2. x∗i ≤ x′ ≤ x∗j
The equal cost lines are,
Pi(x




x∗i ≤ x ≤ x′
bi − qi−i−δix x ≤ x∗i
Pj(x
′, p′, x) = bj − qj−j−δjx x ≤ x′
Where δi = Ci(x
′, p′) and δj = Cj(x′, p′). Taking the derivatives,
P ′i (x
′, p′, x) =
 −x
′p′x−2 < 0 xi∗ ≤ x ≤ x′
(qi − i − δi)x−2 > 0 x ≤ xi∗
P ′j(x
′, p′, x) = (qj − j − δj)x−2 > 0 x ≤ x′
This implies Pi(x
′, p′, x) > Pj(x′, p′, x), ∀x x∗i ≤ x ≤ x′.
Pi(x
′, p′, x∗i ) = bi −
qi − i − δi
x∗i
> Pj(x
′, p′, x∗i ) = bj −
qj − j − δj
x∗i
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Figure 2.6: Example of a possible optimal contract







′, p′, x) ≥ Pj(x′, p′, x), ∀x ≤ x∗i .
Case 3. x′ ≥ x∗j ≥ x∗i
When x ≥ x∗j ≥ x∗i , the equal cost line of both types follow x′p′ = xp. Thus,
Pi(x
′, p′, x∗j) = Pj(x
′, p′, x∗j). Then the case falls into Case 2 and Pi(x
∗
j , Pj(x




′, p′, x∗j), x), ∀x < x∗j .
Lemma 2.17. When the MC is satisfied, the optimal contract such that type i buyer
picks (xi, pi) for all i must have x1 ≤ ... ≤ xK.
Proof. Let (xi, pi) denote the contract designed for the type i buyer. Consider now
the contract for the type j buyer where bj < bi and xj > xi. From Theorem 2.16 we
know that Pj(xi, pi, xj) ≤ Pi(xi, pi, xj) when the MC is satisfied. This implies that
whatever pj we determined, if the type j buyer prefers (xj, pj) over (xi, pi) then the
type i buyer must think the same way. From the IC constraint, the type j buyer has
to prefer the (xj, pj) over (xi, pi). Thus, we must have xj ≤ xi in the optimal contract
where each type of buyer selects its own designated contract.
Lemma 2.18. When the MC is satisfied, the optimal contract must have xi ≤ x∗i
∀i = 1...K.
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Proof. Proof by contradiction. Consider some optimal contract having xi > x
∗
i , we
show that replacing xi = x
∗
i is actually better. By Theorem 2.19, we know that
pi = Pi(xi−1, pi−1, xi) and by definition of Pi it is better off to the seller by providing
x∗i instead if we only consider the profit from the type i buyer. Now, by Theorem
2.15 Pi+1(xi, pi, x
∗
i ) ≤ Pi(xi, pi, x∗i ). Also, because Pi(x′, p′, x) is a strictly increasing
function in p′. The price pi+1 is strictly higher for assigning x∗i instead of xi. This
results in every pj j > i is strictly increased and the payoff change must be positive.
The only question is whether we can assign x∗i without affecting the contracts (xj, pj)
j < i. The answer is if ∀j < i xj ≤ x∗j we can do it. By mathematical induction, we
can again prove that for all i = 1...K xi ≤ x∗i . An example is illustrated in Figure
2.6.
This result allows us to restrict our search for the optimal contract to the set where
xi ≤ x∗i . We can further simplify our search by expressing the values pi, ∀i = 1...K
as functions of xi ∀i = 1...K, by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.19. Given a set x1 ≤ ... ≤ xK, define (x0, p0) = (0, 0) and find the
contracts (xi, pi) = (xi, Pi(xi−1, pi−1, xi)) in the order i = 1...K. When the MC
is satisfied this procedure produces a contract set that maximizes the seller’s profit,
where each type-i buyer accepts (xi, pi).
Proof. a) Each buyer of type i picks (xi, pi).
Induction hypothesis: At each step, when we pick contract (xi, pi) ∀i = 0...K, each
buyer type-j with j < i prefers contract (xj, pj) and each buyer type-j with j ≥ i
prefers contract (xi, pi).
1. Base Case: When picking (x0, p0) = (0, 0), it is clear that each buyer type is
greater than 0 and each buyer prefers the only contract that is the same as not
buying.
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2. Assume the induction hypothesis is true when picking (xi, pi), we will show that
the hypothesis is also true for (xi+1, pi+1). Assume the hypothesis is true for
step i means we have determined the contracts ((x1, p1), ..., (xi, pi)) and a type-j
buyer (j ≤ i) prefers (xj, pj) over other contracts, while a type-j buyer (j > i)
prefers the ith contract over all contracts. By Theorem. 2.16 and xi+1 > xi,
∀j ≤ i, pi+1 = Pi+1(xi, pi, xi+1) ≥ Pj(xi, pi, xi+1)
The contract (xi+1, pi+1) is above the equal cost line of the contract (xi, pi) for
buyer type less than or equal to i. Which means they prefer the ith contract
over the i + 1th contract. But from step i, they prefer their own contract over
existing contracts. Thus, buyer j (j ≤ i) prefers (xj, pj) over all contracts. By
Theorem. 2.15 and xi+1 > xi,
∀j ≥ i+ 1, pi+1 = Pi+1(xi, pi, xi+1) ≤ Pj(xi, pi, xi+1)
Thus, the contract (xi+1, pi+1) is below the equal cost line of the contract (xi, pi)
for buyer type j > i and they prefer (xi+1, pi+1) over (xi, pi). But from step i,
they prefer the (xi, pi) contract over all existing contracts. This shows that the
hypothesis is true for step i+ 1.
3. By Mathematical Induction, the hypothesis is true for all i ≤ K.
b) This process results in the highest profit.
Since the x′is are fixed, the only way one could increase the buyer’s profit is to increase
one of the pi’s. We will show that this is not possible. Assume there exists some




K) with some p
′
i > pi, by the increasing
property of Pi (Lemma 3.4) we need p
′
i−1 > pi−1 to insure that type-i buyer picks
(xi, p
′
i). By induction, we can show that it must be that (p
′
1 > p1). Since p1 = b1,
41
(x1, p1) is already on the boundary of acceptance region of the type-1 buyer. Thus,
any contract with some p′i > pi is not a contract where each buyer accepts its own
designated contract.
Figure 2.6 shows an example of applying this theorem with three buyer types:
given x1 = 2, x2 = 4, x3 = 6, pi is sequentially determined on the equal-cost line of
the previous contract. With Lemma 2.18, the equal cost line can be restricted to the




r1x1(b1 − c) + ...+ rixi(pi − c) + ...+ rKxK(pK − c)
= max
x1≤...≤xK
r1x1(b1 − c) + ...+ rixi(Pi(xi−1, pi−1, xi)− c) + ...
+ ...+ rKxK(PK(xK−1, pK−1, xK)− c)
By plugging in the values of pi = Pi(xi−1, pi−1, xi) = bi − xi−1xi (bi − pi−1) recursively.
Each term in the optimization problem can be simplified to




By simplifying and separate the terms with respect to xi, the expected profit of the









Firstly, we observe that the above expression is linear in every xi. Thus differentiating
with respect to xi we get a constant:
∂E[R(C)]
∂xi





Secondly, because the term ∂E[R(C)]
∂xi
does not depend on any xj, the optimizer can
be easily determined. When ∂E[R(C)]
∂xi
> 0 we want to make xi as large as possible
(≤ x∗i ); when ∂E[R(C)]∂xi < 0 we want to make xi as small as possible. This leads us
to the following algorithm which finds the optimal set of (x1, ..., xK). The variable
LD (Last Determined) below is used to keep track of the last type for which we have
already determined its value.
Algorithm 1 Optimal contract under monotonicity condition
Let xK ← xK∗, LD ← K . because ∂E[R(C)]∂xK > 0
for i = K − 1→ 1 do
pi ← (bi − c)
∑LD−1
j=i rj − (bi+1 − bi)
∑K
j=LD rj
if pi > 0 then
∀i ≤ j < LD, xj ← x∗i
LD ← i
else if i = 1 then
∀1 ≤ j < LD, xj ← 0
end if
end for
This algorithm works as follows: We start from determining the value of xK , then
we determine xK−1 and so on all the way to x1. At step i we take the derivative with
respect to xi. If it is better to maximize it, we assign it to be x
∗
i . If it is better to
minimize it, we push the value to xi−1 (which we have not determined). However,
we have to add the probability of occurrence ri to the value (xi−1) we pushed to so
that it reflects the weight of occurrence when determining the value xi−1. Once we
determined the value for some xi, every xj previously pushed to it will be assigned
the same value.
Together with Theorem 2.19 the above algorithm produces a set of (xi, pi)’s that’s
optimal under the monotonicity condition. This algorithm takes exactly K steps to
find the optimal contract set. While calculating the
∑
ri might also takeK steps, with
careful calculation the method can still be completed in O(K) time. By comparison,
an exhaustive search method will take O((XP )K) time to find the optimal contract
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even if we discretize the search space of x and p with X and P possible values. When
x and p are continuous, an exhaustive search might not even be possible.
2.7 Discussions
2.7.1 More general models of channel quality B
Although some of the analysis in this chapter relies on B being a binary random
variable, most of our definitions can be easily generalized to any random variable,
such as the acceptance region, equal-cost line and maxi are general to any B. Take
for instance the notion of acceptance region. Consider any random variable B with
support [0, 1]. By the definition of C(x, p), the reserved cost C(0, 0) = q −  is
unchanged. The acceptance region of a single buyer type can still be calculated using
T = {(x, p) : C(x, p) ≤ C(0, 0)} with the boundary being f(x) = maxpC(x, p) ∈ T . It
is also easy to show that the optimal contract for the buyer must be on this boundary,
thus optimal = maxx U(x, f(x)). Similarly, the equal-cost line will continue to be
strictly ordered according to the price p. With these set calculated explicitly, the
same process of contract selection can be used. For example, if under some ordered
conditions of B, the equal-cost lines can be shown to satisfy Theorem 2.15, 2.16;
then a process similar to Algorithm 1 can be applied to the problem. An extension
of the contract model which considers general utility functions and channel random
variables is discussed in Chapter III.
2.7.2 A seller with limited resource
Our analysis so far has been based on the assumption that the seller has sufficient
bandwidth to fulfill all accepted contracts. We now discuss what happens when the
seller’s resources are limited. In the full information case when the seller knows the




to a buyer of type i. Under a resource constraint, because the seller can offer any
0 < x < x∗i (when p is set to bi), this becomes a form of the continuous (fractional)
knapsack problem [21].
When buyer types are private information, we consider 3 possible scenarios and
methods to determine the optimal contract solution by modifying Algorithm 1 in
Section 3.4. We assume at most X¯ bandwidth can be sold and the monotonicity
condition is satisfied for simplicity.
Case 1: The seller knows that there is only one buyer, does not know its type,
but knows the distribution of the type. This is the same as the case of K > 2
under MC condition except that the maximum bandwidth sold is limited by X¯. If
we have ∀x∗i ≤ X¯, then Algorithm 1 works without modification. But if for some i,
x∗i > X¯, then the algorithm no long works. Note that in determining the optimal set
xi, Algorithm 1 does not explicitly determine the value of each xi but only whether
we need to push the xi value bigger or smaller. Also the analysis does not rely on the
actual values of x∗i , but only that ∀i < j, x∗i ≤ x∗j . This discussion leads to the next
result.
Corollary 2.20. Let ∀i, xˆ∗i = min(x∗i , X¯), then running Algorithm 1 on the set (bi, xˆ∗i )
will result in the optimal contract for limited bandwidth X¯ with a single customer.
Case 2: The seller knows that there are Ni of each possible type, but cannot
distinguish between the different types. Letting ri = Ni, Algorithm 2 finds the optimal
contract when there is insufficient bandwidth. Note that this algorithm is similar to
Algorithm 1 with two differences: 1) it replaces the distribution in Algorithm 1 by the
actual number of buyers of each type. 2) it designs contracts for higher buyer types.
Changing the distribution of buyers to actual number of buyers will not change the
optimality of Algorithm 1 if the bandwidth is sufficient. If bandwidth is insufficient,
because an optimal contract must have pi ≥ pj for bi ≥ bj, it is preferable to keep
higher buyer types. The step i where the algorithm breaks is the cutoff type that
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should be accepted; any type smaller will not be considered in the contract. All
previous types pushed to the same values of this cutoff type are then recalculated
such that the bandwidth amount satisfies the constraint (X¯). The price determining
process (pi+1 = Pi(xi), pi, xi+1)) is then applied on this set, with price pi = bi as the
first contract.
Algorithm 2 Limited resource
Let xK ← xK∗, LD ← K . because ∂E[R(C)]∂xK > 0
for i = K − 1→ 1 do
pi ← (bi − c)
∑LD−1
j=i rj − (bi+1 − bi)
∑K
j=LD rj
if pi > 0 then
∀i ≤ j < LD, xj ← x∗i
if
∑K





else if i = 1 then









Case 3: Users arrive as a Poisson random process. This is a case that is similar to
that studied in [43], where it is shown that repeatedly solving the expected version of
the stochastic optimization problem will result in a policy with expected revenue lost
upper bounded by a constant which is independent of the size (X¯) of the problem.
Notice that Case 2 is exactly the expected version of this stochastic optimization
problem, thus, we can again use Algorithm 2 to solve the problem.
2.7.3 Learning buyer types
We have assumed in our analysis that the seller knows a priori the buyer distri-
bution which is discrete. If this distribution is unknown, it can be obtained through
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online learning. Consider a stream of arriving buyers and a seller offering contracts
designed not only to make profit (exploit) but also to learn the buyer type distribu-
tion (explore) by observing whether the contract is accepted or rejected. This can be
cast as a multi-armed bandit problem with an independent reward process (assuming
buyers are independently drawn from a distribution), and potentially a continuum
of arms (each contract is an arm under this model). Algorithms exist in the litera-
ture that produce sublinear regret (defined as the profit difference between the best
single contract and the algorithm) in time [8], and logarithmic regret in time when
the number of arms is finite [7]. Although the continuum contract (arm) space might
seem a challenge, we note that Algorithm 1 always generates a set of contracts with
xis a subset of {x∗1, x∗2...x∗K}. From Theorem 2.19, if we know the set of xis, we can
explicitly determine the optimal price. Thus, there are only 2K possible contracts
that can be optimal. Using this observation, one can construct a learning algorithm
like that in [8] to achieve logarithmic regret.
2.7.4 Comparing to auction
Auction has been used extensively for the allocation of spectrum on the traditional,
wholesale market, and has been proposed for the secondary market as well, see e.g.,
[70, 31, 40]. Auction is a mechanism aimed at extracting profit from the sale of
rare goods for which potential buyers’ valuation is unknown and can be very hard to
obtain. The contract mechanism studied in this chapter may be viewed as a form of
sale by posted price. Compared to auction, posted price is more often used in the sale
of multiple (and potentially large quantity of) similar goods, the valuation of which is
obtained through market research [69]. Since the cost spent on market research can
be amortized over multiple goods, posted price sale can be more efficient than auction
which incurs cost in conducting each single auction [74]. It has been shown that under
ideal conditions the two are equivalent in profit generation [58]. As more and more
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license holders become interested in the secondary market trading smaller quantities
for shorter duration of time compared to the primary wholesale market, we believe
pricing schemes like the contracts studied in this chapter offer a valid alternative to
spectrum auctions.
2.8 Numerical Evaluation
In this section, we compare the performance of contracts generated by the follow-
ing methods under limited and unlimited resource constraints.
1. The optimal set of M contracts (denoted OPT(M) in the figures): Finding this
set is done by an exhaustive search over a set of discretized values x and p as an
approximation of the uncountable choices (the step size for x is 0.5 and the step
size for p is 0.1). As discussed earlier in Section 2.6.2, the complexity increases
exponentially in M . This restricts us to run at most M = 2 in our evaluation.
2. The algorithm we introduced in the previous section (Algorithm 1 (Algorithm
2) in the unlimited (limited) resource setting, denoted as ALG1 (ALG2) in the
figures): As previously shown, ALG1/ALG2 is optimal when the monotonicity
condition holds. Since the complexity of this algorithm increases only linearly
in M , M can be on the order of thousands in our numerical evaluation.
3. A K-choose-1 method (denoted as MAX in the figures): This is the method that
selects the contract with the highest expected profit over the set {max1,max2, · · · ,maxK}:
maximize
maxi,i=1...K
E[U(maxi)]. This is done by checking all (bi, x
∗
i ) pairs; the complex-
ity increases linearly in M .
2.8.1 Unlimited resource
The experiments are run by increasing K = 1...7. For each K value the parameters
(qi, bi, i, ri) are independently and randomly generated from uniform distributions
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(bi ∈ [0, 1], qi ∈ [0, 10], i ∈ [0, 2] and ri ∈ [0, 1] but normalized such that
∑
ri = 1)
For each K we record the average (in expected profit) over 12000 randomly generated
cases; these are plotted in Figure 2.7. We repeat the same but only for cases that
satisfy the monotonicity condition; results are shown in Figure 2.8.































OPT(2) with 1 std
Figure 2.7: Simulation results of the sellers profit versus different contracts in the
general case. (The inset is the standard deviation of OPT(2))






























ALG1 with 1 std
Figure 2.8: Simulation results of the sellers profit versus different contracts when
increasing property holds. (The inset is the standard deviation of ALG1)
Our observations are as follows. Being able to use more contracts is always better
as expected (i.e., OPT(1) ≤ OPT(2) in all cases). When the monotonicity condition
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holds, ALG1 is optimal and thus outperforms all other algorithms. When K = 1, 2
OPT(2) should have been optimal but it falls below ALG1 due to the discretization
error. When K > 2, ALG1 further has the advantage of being able to use more
than 2 contracts. Recall that MAX is the optimal contract when the seller knows
exactly the type; thus, MAX is optimal when K = 1 and outperforms exhaustive
search because it does not suffer from discretization error. In the general case when
the monotonicity does not necessarily hold, although ALG1 is not always optimal it
still outperforms both OPT(1) and OPT(2). Finally, when there are more possible
buyer types (as K increases), the maximum expected profit decreases because it is
harder to put all the contracts right on the buyers’ acceptance boundaries while still
satisfying the incentive compatibility condition.
We show the standard deviation for ALG1 under the monotonicity condition and
OPT(2) under the general case in Figures 2.7 and 2.8, respectively. Other cases
are similar and thus not shown for better readability. We see that the deviation is
decreases as the number of buyer types increases. This is because the amount of profit
depends on the realization of the buyer types (q, b, ). With fewer buyer types, the
profit changes heavily depends on the realization, e.g., a type with very low channel
quality can lead to low profit. With more buyer types, the profit is averaged out over
the buyer distribution and thus has a smaller variation.
In Figures 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 we show the results for averaging over 12000 cases
satisfying the monotonicity condition. In Figure 2.9, we show the buyers gain over not
accepting any contract. It shows that as more buyer types exist, the buyer’s average
gain increases as expected. In Figure 2.10, we show the sum of the buyers’ and the
seller’s gains. We see that only in the case of ALG1, the total utility remains constant
as the number of types increases. This shows that ALG1 generates contracts that are
more socially optimal. In Figure 2.11, we show the portion of buyers accepting one
of the contracts. We observe that as the number of buyer types increases, a larger
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Figure 2.9: Buyer utility























Figure 2.10: Total utility of buyer and seller
portion of buyers walk away from all contracts. Note that ALG1 has the highest
participation rate.
2.8.2 Limited resource
We next perform the same experiments under the limited resource condition.
The simulations are done with randomly generated buyer types not satisfying the
monotonicity condition. Algorithm 2 is used to replace Algorithm 1. The possible
buyer type is fixed at K = 3 with 3 buyers of each type. We change the x-axis to the
resource limit and test it from insufficient bandwidth to sufficient bandwidth.
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Figure 2.11: Buyer participation rate



























Figure 2.12: Seller profit per bandwidth limit
Figure 2.12 shows the seller’s profit per unit of bandwidth (y-axis) as a function of
its bandwidth limit (x-axis), while Figure 2.13 shows the amount left unsold. We see
that when the seller has very limited amount of bandwidth, it can sell all of it and
enjoys a high unit profit. When it has more bandwidth than the purchasing need,
its unit profit drops. This happens for two reasons: 1) When it has little to sell,
the seller tends to target the higher type that accepts the contract at higher prices.
When it has more, the seller wants to sell more. In this case, it will have to sell to
lower buyer types which only accept at lower prices. 2) When there is a surplus of
supply, bandwidth left unsold generates no profit. Also from Figure 2.12, we see that
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Figure 2.13: Amount of bandwidth left






























Figure 2.14: Number of buyers participated
ALG2 generates the most profit over all other methods considered. In Figure 2.14 we
observe that ALG2 acquires the most number of buyers to the contract. Although
there is a total of 9 buyers (3 buyers of each of 3 types), all methods on average
sell to much fewer than 9 in the sufficient bandwidth region (4 to 6 buyers). This is
explained by our earlier analysis (in the unlimited case) where it is shown that it may
be in the seller’s interest to not sell to the smaller buyer types in order to increase
profit from the higher types.
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Figure 2.15: Amount of bandwidth purchased from the reference market
2.8.3 Bandwidth purchased from the reference market
We end this section by considering the amount of bandwidth the buyer needs
to purchase from the reference market, shown in Figure 2.15 as a function of the
transmission need q and different tolerance . Here we assume a common channel
condition where the seller can sell at the optimal contract (x∗, b). We fix the channel
quality at b = 0.5 and vary the other quantities. We can see that for each , the
purchased bandwidth is 0 while q is small. When q increases, the amount needed
starts to increase. Note that this is the minimum amount of guaranteed service the
buyer has to purchase regardless of how much secondary bandwidth already purchased
(see discussion after Lemma 1).
2.9 Conclusion
We considered a contract design problem where a primary license holder wishes to
profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it to potential secondary users/buyers
via designing a set of profitable contracts. We completely characterize the optimal
solution in the cases where there is a single buyer type, and when multiple types of
buyers share a common, known channel condition. In the case when each type of
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buyers have different channel conditions we construct an algorithm that generates
a set of contracts in a computationally efficient manner, and show that this set is
optimal when the buyer types satisfy a monotonicity condition.
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CHAPTER III
Generalization of Secondary Trading Using
Contracts
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we extend the method developed in Chapter II to a more general
framework where the buyers and the seller are given by more general utility functions.
In particular, we will show that concepts such as the equal-cost line introduced in
Chapter II can be applied beyond the set of specific utility functions assumed. In
what follows we will first restate the problem in a more generalized framework in
Section 3.2, and then analyze the single buyer type in Section 3.3 and characterize the
properties of the optimal contract. We derive the equivalent condition in the multiple
buyer case such that the sequential process introduced in Chapter II produces the
optimal contract in Section 3.4.
3.2 Model and Assumptions
In this section, we describe in detail the generalized model. Although the utility
functions are different, some of the key concepts such as how the two parties consider
their choices follow the assumption of the previous chapter. Thus, we will not repeat
all the definitions that can be extended here.
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3.2.1 The Seller
The seller’s profit or utility from contract (x, p) is given as
U(x, p, c)
where c is a predetermined constant that takes into account the operating cost of
the seller. We will keep this function unspecified and only assume that the utility
of the seller is increasing in the price of the contract p when keeping the amount
of bandwidth sold x at a fixed value. If none of the contracts is accepted by the
buyer, the reserve utility of the owner is given by U(0, 0, c). We will assume that any
contract the seller presents must be such that U(x, p, c) ≥ U(0, 0, c), i.e., the seller
will not sell at a loss.
3.2.2 The buyer’s consideration
For a given contract pair (x, p) where x is the amount of secondary bandwidth
sold and p is the price per bandwidth sold, the total payment to the primary is
xp. Suppose in addition to this contract, the buyer purchases y units of guaranteed
bandwidth from the reference market. Let w(xp + y) denote the cost function of
purchasing contract (x, p) and y guaranteed channels. We do not specify the function
w(.) but only assume that it is increasing in the value xp+y (the total money spent).
The buyer has a constraint on its transmission quality, given by an indicator
function Q(x, y) that characterizes different buyer types:
Q(x, y) =
 0 the combination (x, y) does not satisfy the buyer’s needs1 the combination (x, y) satisfies the buyer’s needs
The function Q(x, y) captures the buyer’s transmission needs and can take into ac-
count the variability of the secondary channel. Subsequently this function will also
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be referred to as the buyer’s type. Q(x, y) can be of any form, but is assumed to be
such that for any (x, y) pair that satisfies the buyer’s quality of service requirements,
(x′, y′) must also be satisfactory if x′ ≥ x and y′ ≥ y, i.e., getting more bandwidth of
either kind will not make the requirements harder to meet.
The buyer’s consideration is given by the following minimization problem where
we use C(x, p,Q) to denote the cost for the buyer if he chooses to accept the contract
(x, p).
C(x, p,Q) = minimize
y
w(y + xp) (3.1)
subject to Q(x, y) = 1 (3.2)
To assess how much this contract actually costs him, the buyer has to consider how
much additional fixed service he needs to purchase to fulfill his needs. The buyer can
always choose to not enter into any of the presented contracts and only purchase from
the traditional market. In this case, his cost is given by the value of the following
minimization problem:
C(0, 0, Q) = minimize
y
w(y) (3.3)
subject to Q(0, y) = 1 (3.4)
In deciding whether to accept a given contract (x, p), the buyer has to consider
(1) whether the contract would satisfy its quality (loss) constraint, and (2) whether
there is an incentive to enter into this contract, i.e., whether the cost of this contract
is no higher than the reserve price. The first can always be achieved by purchasing
more reference spectrum. The second is also referred to as the individual rationality
(IR) constraint, C(x, p,Q) ≤ C(0, 0, Q). Any contract that satisfies both constraints
of a buyer is referred to as acceptable to that buyer.
Considering the form of the buyer’s optimization problem, the buyer chooses the
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minimum amount of y to minimize cost. Let y(x,Q) denote the minimum additional
y that needs to be purchased given the contracted amount x for a buyer of type Q.
Note that this does not depend on the price p but only depends on the value x and
the buyer type Q.
y(x,Q) = argmin
y
Q(x, y) = 1
Thus, we can rewrite C(x, p,Q) = w(xp + y(x,Q)) as the minimum total cost of
buyer type Q when accepting contract (x, p). The function y(x,Q) depends on the
buyer type Q function, but for a reasonable loss constraint y(x,Q) should be non-
increasing in the value x, i.e., the buyer should need less from the reference market
if he purchases more from the secondary market.
Example 3.1. Taking the model in Chapter II, the function Q(x, y) would be
Q(x, y) := I(E[(q − y − xB)+]−  ≤ 0) , (3.5)
where B is the binary random variable with probability b of being 1. The constants
(q, b, ) represent the different types of buyer under the same form of quality con-
straint. The function y(x,Q) would be as follows.
When q(1− b) ≤ ,
y(x,Q) =




When q(1− b) > ,
y(x,Q) =
 q − − bx if x ≤ x
∗
q − 




3.2.3 Buyer types and informational constraints
We will still assume that a potential buyer may be one of a number of different
types; each type is characterized by a unique function Q, which is a buyer’s private
information. The seller is assumed to know the distribution of the buyer types but
not the actual type of a particular buyer. The buyer types and their distribution may
be estimated from the seller’s past experience. Specifically, we will assume there are
K types of buyers, and a buyer is of type i with probability ri and is given by the
set Qi. In subsequent sections we will first discuss the case of a single user type, then
the case of multiple types.
3.3 Optimal contract for a single buyer type
We begin by considering the case where there is only one type of buyer Q. Denote
by TQ = {(x, p) : C(x, p,Q) ≤ C(0, 0, Q)} the set of all acceptable contracts for the
buyer, or the acceptance region. All possible contracts can be represented by a point
on the x-p plane and the set TQ consists of an area on the x-p plane. Recall that the
buyer will only accept a contract if the cost of accepting the contract is less than or
equal to not accepting the contract. For a fixed x, because the cost of the buyer is
increasing in p, the highest price p such that the buyer will accept the contract is
w(xp+ y(x)) = w(0 + y(0)) .
We can express the highest price t(x,Q) = y(0,Q)−y(x,Q)
x
of an amount of bandwidth x
for a type Q. Let t(x,Q) denote the upper boundary of the area TQ on the x-p plane
and all points below p < t(x,Q) (contracts having lower price) are acceptable to the
buyer.
Similar to the previous chapter, we can derive the equal-cost line of a buyer.
Definition 3.2. The equal-cost line E of a buyer of type Q is the set of contracts
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within the buyer’s acceptance region T that are of equal cost to the buyer. Thus
(x, p) ∈ E if and only if p = PQ(x′, p′, x) for some other (x′, p′) ∈ E. The cost of this
line is given by C(x′, p′), ∀(x′, p′) ∈ E.
Using the function y(x,Q) introduced in Section 3.2 we have:
C(x, p,Q) = C(x′, p′, Q)
⇔ w(xp+ y) = w(x′p′ + y′)
⇔ xp+ y(x,Q) = x′p′ + y(x′, Q)
⇔ PQ(x, p, x′) = xp+ y(x,Q)− y(x
′, Q)
x′
Among the set of equal-cost lines, the line PQ(0, 0, x) = t(x,Q) is equivalent to the
acceptance boundary as defined previously.
For a given buyer type (Q), the seller can calculate the region TQ and choose any
point in the corresponding acceptance region TQ to maximize its utility: max(x,p)∈TQ U(x, p, c),
since U(x, p, c) represents the seller’s profit obtained from selling the contract (x, p).
We will assume that the utility is increasing in p for a fixed x. We can show some of
the properties of the optimal contract in the single buyer case.
Lemma 3.3. The contract that maximizes the primaries profit is on the boundary
t(x,Q).
This is based on the fact that U(x, p, c) is increasing in p. We denote this maximum
point as maxQ for a buyer type Q. Once the seller determines the optimal contract
and presents it to the buyer, the buyer will accept because it satisfies both the loss
and the IR constraints. The buyer’s cost in accepting is exactly the reserved cost
C(0, 0, Q) because the contract is on the boundary. Every contract below an equal-
cost line is strictly preferable to a contract on the line for the buyer. This observation
is true as long as w(.) is an increasing function.
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Lemma 3.4. As p′ increases, P (x′, p′, x) is strictly increasing in the buyer cost.
This lemma is easily shown by noting C(x′, p′, Q) = w(y(x′) + x′p′). Thus, p > p′
implies C(x′, p, Q) > C(x′, p′, Q).
Lastly, after the seller determines the form of the equal-cost line of the buyers
the cost related to each line is no longer important. This is because in designing the
contracts, the seller only has to know which contract is more preferable to the buyer.
Also, the profit of the seller only depends on whether the buyer accepts the contract
but not on the type of the buyer. Thus, the buyer’s cost function w(.) can be of any
form which does not affect any of our analysis further on.
3.4 Multiple buyer types
We discuss two cases in this section: (1) the seller can only give out one contract
(2) the seller can give out as many different contracts needed.
3.4.1 Single Contract
When the seller can only give out one contract, there are two factors that affect
the total profit generated from this single contract. The first is the profit contract
(x, p) generates if it is chosen which is U(x, p, c). The second is the probability that
contract (x, p) will be selected; this depends on the buyer types and the distribution of
the buyer types. The factors depend on the actual realization of the seller/buyer type
and distribution, but we can characterize some properties of the single best contract.
Lemma 3.5. The optimal single contract is on the acceptance boundary of one of the
buyer types.
Proof. Let’s assume that the boundaries of each buyer type divides the plane x-p
plane into n areas. Let’s label these regions as G1, ..., Gn. For each Gi, it must be
either Gi ⊂ Tj or Gi ⊂ TCj for all i, j. (where TCj denotes the complement of the
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region Tj) Thus, all contracts inside a region Gi are accepted by the same set of
buyer types and not accepted by the other buyer types. Since inside each region Gi,
all contracts are accepted with the same probability, the only factor is U(x, p, c). The
contract that has the highest U(x, p, c) must be on the boundary of Gi which implies
it is on the boundary of one Tj. This completes the proof that the optimal single
contract must be on the acceptance boundary of one of the buyer types.
3.4.2 Multiple Contracts
3.4.2.1 maxi /∈ Tj for all i, j
Under the condition maxi /∈ Tj for all i, j, each buyer type prefers different types
of contracts and this does not conflict with the seller’s profit. The optimal set of
contracts will be {max1, ...,maxK}. Because maxi /∈ Tj for all i, j, each buyer type
i considers other maxj as unacceptable contracts. Thus, the seller can use this set
{max1, ...,maxK} and get the profit as if first knowing the buyer type and giving out
the corresponding contract.
3.4.2.2 Generalized Monotonicity Condition
For multiple buyer types in the generalized utility function for buyer and sellers, we
define a similar monotonicity condition as in Chapter II. We say that the monotonicity
condition (MC2) is satisfied if we can find an ordering of the buyer types 1, 2, ..., K
such that the following property is true.
Definition 3.6. The buyer types are said to satisfy a monotonicity condition (MC2),
if ∀i > j, x < x′, Pi(x′, p′, x) < Pj(x′, p′, x) and ∀i > j, x > x′, Pi(x′, p′, x) >
Pj(x
′, p′, x)
This monotonicity condition (MC2) says that there exists an ordering in the buyer
types such that higher types have higher valuation for more bandwidth purchased.
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It can be shown that MC2 is implied by the monotonicity condition (MC) for the
specific utility function in Chapter II. If MC2 is satisfied, then Lemma 2.17 says
that the optimal contract set must have the xi’s ordered. Theorem 2.19 also follows
through because we have assumed that the seller’s profit is increasing in p and from
Lemma 3.4 the equal-cost lines are strictly increasing in the buyer’s cost.
By Theorem 2.19, the generalized problem can be reduced from the space {xi, pi}




r1U(x1, p1)...+ rKU(xK , pK) (3.6)
= max
x1≤...≤xK
r1U(x1, pb1(0, 0, x1)) + ...+ rKU(xK , pbK (xK−1, pK−1, xK)) .
Since we prefer not to specify the function w(.), we cannot proceed as in Chapter II.
However, we note that the procedure in Theorem 2.19 has a special property that
if we fix the contract (xi, pi) for buyer type i, then the optimal set of contracts for
buyer type i+1, ..., K does not depend on the optimal contract set of the buyer types
below i. Thus we discretize the x-p plane into a grid where X and P denote the
number of x and p values. We can utilize a dynamic programming method to reduce
the complexity of finding the optimal contract set. Let g(x, p, i) denote the maximum
profit from giving out contract (x, p) to buyer type i and the optimal contract set
to the buyer types above i. We can easily calculate the values of g(x, p, i − 1) for
the entire x-p plane with the following method. For each grid g(x, p, i− 1), since we
are giving out (x, p) for the buyer type i− 1, we know that the optimal contract for
the buyer type i must be of the form (x′, Pi(x, p, x′)) from Theorem 2.19. Thus, we
only need to compare at most X different values to determine g(x, p, i − 1). After
determining all (x, p) values for g(x, p, i − 1) we can repeat the same process for
g(x, p, i− 2). Thus, the complexity of the algorithm is KX2P which is polynomial in
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the number of buyer types compared to the (XP )K of the brute force search.
Algorithm 3 Optimal contract using Dynamic Programming
for k = K → 1 do
for i = 1→ X do
for j = 1→ P do
if (x(i), p(j)) /∈ Tk then
g(i, j, k)← 0
else if k == K then
g(i, j, k)← rkU(X(i), P (j))
else
g(i, j, k)← rkU(X(i), P (j)) +max
i′>i








We give the pseudo code (Alg. 3) of the described algorithm. The x, p values are
discretized to X,P number of values, and we can iterated them from small to large
by 1, ..., X (1, ..., P ). Here x(i) and p(j) denote the transformation from integer to
the actual real number. We use [p] to denote the mapping from a real number p to
the index of the closest discretized value smaller than p. The algorithm returns the
maximum profit achievable, and the contract set can be determined by back tracking.
Below we list the main differences of the generalized contract design framework
compared with Chapter II.
• Buyer’s quality constraint:
In this chapter the buyer’s quality constraint can be any reasonable indicator
function Q(x, y) that takes x (the amount of secondary bandwidth) and y (the
amount of reference bandwidth) as input. The randomness of the secondary
spectrum can be represented by any type of random variable described by the
indicator function. Since quality should increase by purchasing more bandwidth,
the indicator function is assumed to be increasing in both x and y.
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• Buyer’s cost function:
In Chapter II, the buyer’s utility function was the total amount of money spent
xp+y. In this chapter, we generalized the buyer’s cost function to any function
increasing in the total amount of money spent w(xp+ y).
• Monotonicity condition:
We proposed a generalization of the monotonicity condition defined by the
equal-cost lines. The monotonicity condition requires that we can find an or-
dering of the buyer types where higher types have higher valuation for more
bandwidth.
• Seller’s profit function:
In Chapter II, the seller’s profit function was restricted to a linear form U(x, p) =
x(p − c). The optimal contract could be derived analytically under the mono-
tone condition. In this chapater, we generalized the seller’s profit function to
any function that is increasing in both x and p. Under the generalized mono-
tone condition, we obtain the optimal contract using a dynamic programming
approach.
3.5 Probability of Loss Example
In this section, we show how to apply the general framework derived in this
chapter to specific buyer/seller utility functions. Consider a buyer who may not
have a constraint on the expected transmission loss but on the probability of loss.
This could be the case when partial reception of a packet is not accepted so that an
entire packet needs to be retransmitted due to error, or when there is a strict delay
requirement so that lost packets are not retransmitted (e.g., in the case of real-time
streaming). In such cases the probability of loss is a more relevant measure. We
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express the probability of loss constraint by the following expression:
Qi(x, y) = I(P (qi − y − xbiB > 0) < i), (3.7)
where B is an uniform random variable between 0 and 1. The constant b ∈ [0, 1]
denotes the channel condition (defined by the buyer type). By purchasing x units
of secondary spectrum, the buyer gets a throughput of xbiB. qi is the transmission
needed and qi − y − xbiB is the amount left untransmitted.
We first derive the function y(x):
P (q − xBb− y > 0) ≤ ⇔ P (B < q − y
xb
) ≤  (3.8)
⇔ q − y
xb
≤  . (3.9)
For the buyer, the minimum amount of additional purchase y is,
y(x) = max(q − xb, 0) (3.10)
That is, if x > q
b
there is no need to buy additional reference bandwidth. If x < q
b
,
the buyer purchases q − xb. The equal-cost line has two different forms depending
on the different cases.
• Case: x > q
b
In this region y = 0, the cost of the buyer is of the form u(xp+y) = u(x′p′+y′)⇔
xp+ y = x′p′. The equal-cost line takes the form p(x, p, x′) = xp/x′.
• Case: x ≤ q
b
In this region y = q−xb. u(xp+y) = u(x′p′+y′)⇔ xp+q−xb = x′p′+q−x′b
The equal-cost line takes the form p(x, p, x′) = b−p
x′ x+ b.
To verify whether the monotonicity condition holds, we can take the derivative of the
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equal-cost line with respect to x′. For x > q
b
,




The derivative of the equal-cost line with respect to x′ is always increasing in x′ and
for larger b the slope is greater. Thus, the higher type here is defined as b. For
x ≤ q
b
, the equal cost line is the same for all types, thus, we need that the region for
the second case be larger for higher types. In conclusion, for the buyer types to have
an ordering, we need the following property.
Proposition 3.7. If there exists an ordering in the buyer types 1..K such that b11 ≤
... ≤ bKK and q1/b11 ≤ ... ≤ qK/bKK.
If Proposition 3.7 holds, then we know that Algorithm 3 is optimal. We will
use the function U(x, p) = (x(p − 0.1))0.5 as the utility function of the seller in our
simulation. Note that the buyer’s cost function w(x, p) can be of any form as long as
it is increasing in p. Similar to the previous section, we compare contracts derived
from different methods under the monotonicity condition.
1. The optimal set of M contracts (denoted OPT(M) in the figures): Finding this
set is done by an exhaustive search over a set of discretized values x and p as
an approximation of the uncountable choices (the step size for x is 0.5 and the
step size for p is 0.1).
2. The algorithm we introduced in the previous section: Algorithm 3
3. A K-choose-1 method (denoted as MAX in the figures): This is the method that
selects the contract with the highest expected profit over the set {max1, · · · ,maxK}.
This is done by checking all (bii, qi/bii) pairs; the complexity increases linearly
in M .
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The experiments are run by increasing K = 1...7. For each K value the parameters
(qi, bi, i, ri) are independently and randomly generated from uniform distributions
(bi ∈ [0, 1], qi ∈ [0, 10], i ∈ [0, 2] and ri ∈ [0, 1] but normalized such that
∑
ri = 1)
For each K we record the average (in expected profit) over 12000 cases that satisfy
the monotonicity condition; results are shown in Figure 3.1. Our observations are as
follows. Being able to use more contracts is always better as expected (i.e., OPT(1)
≤ OPT(2) in all cases). ALG is optimal under the monotonicity constraint and
thus outperforms all other algorithms. OPT(1) is optimal for K = 1 and OPT(2) is
optimal for K = 1, 2. Because both OPT and ALG work on the discretized plane,
ALG does not have the advantage as in the previous chapter. When there are more
possible buyer types (as K increases), the maximum expected profit decreases because
it is harder to put all the contracts right on the buyers’ acceptance boundaries while
still satisfying the incentive compatibility condition. Lastly, maxi is not optimal for
K = 1 because it is approximated to the closest discretized grid.
























In this chapter, we generalized the contract design problem (Chapter II) where a
primary license holder wishes to profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it
to potential secondary users/buyers via designing a set of profitable contracts. The
cost function of the buyer can be any function that is increasing in the money spent,
while the quality constraint can be any function that can be mapped to the additional
reference spectrum needed. The utility of the seller can be any form that is increasing
in the price per bandwidth. We characterize the optimal solution where there is a
single buyer type. In the case when more than one buyer types exist, we construct
an algorithm that generates a set of contracts in a computationally efficient manner,




A Regulated Oligopoly Multi-Market Model for
Secondary Spectrum Trading
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we examine the effectiveness of posted price sale mechanism in the
context of secondary spectrum trading. Due to spectrum under-utilization and the
emergence of wireless applications requiring a variety of spectrum products in terms
of time duration and bandwidth (e.g., Internet of Things, body-area networks, etc.),
it is increasingly likely that primary spectrum holders will trade unused spectrum in
small pieces, both in terms of bandwidth and time duration. At the same time, as
more applications turn to the secondary market to purchase spectrum, the valuation
of spectrum products also becomes easier to determine. For these reasons, holding
auction for each piece may no longer be the only choice or a good choice, and posted
sale becomes a viable alternative.
A number of studies have looked into spectrum trading using contract design by
a primary holder. In [25] a contract based framework was proposed for cooperative
spectrum sharing, whereby the primary offers certain amount of spectrum access to
secondary users in exchange for help in relaying data for the primary. Both [32, 63]
studied a monopoly market where a single primary designs contracts that maximize its
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profit when selling to different secondary types each having different communication
needs. [46] considered the contract between a single primary and a single secondary
and examined different outcomes when either dominates the contract form. In [77],
the interference between simultaneous secondary buyers was considered in the model,
and heuristics were introduced in solving the profit maximization and spectrum allo-
cation problem.
However, in most of existing works the competition among sellers is rarely dis-
cussed with the notable exception of [26], where a two-stage game in a duopoly setup
was studied. Under this model, the two primaries choose the amount of spectrum
they will lease in the first stage, and then compete in the second stage. Their results
show that there exists a threshold in the difference of their respective leasing costs
which determines where either player will remain in the market.
Our goal in this study is to analyze the resulting spectrum market where multiple
sellers participate in the posted sale of multiple spectrum products, each catered to
the needs of a different type of secondary user, and determine whether profit-efficient
equilibria can be achieved.
4.1.1 Our approach and modeling perspective
We consider the sellers’ competition with a goal of extracting profit. In this sense
our analysis takes the view of the primary license holders and seeks to understand
how they can be incentivized to participate in secondary spectrum trading.
When considering competition in markets, the often used models are the Bertrand
and Cournot competition models [10, 22]. The Bertrand model shows that with
just two sellers, the market reaches perfect competition and both sellers sell at the
marginal price. Specifically, it assumes that competing firms produce a homogeneous
product; thus products from different firms are interchangeable, the result being that
customers will always purchase from the firm that sets the lowest price. It follows
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that the only equilibrium point is when all firms set their price at the unit cost of
production. Under the Cournot model, firms compete by choosing the amount of
output they produce. Although they can choose their production quantity at will,
the total amount all firms produce affects the market price of that product, the result
being that the price approaches the marginal price as the number of sellers increases.
In reality we do not often see perfect competition where firms sell at marginal
prices. Modification of these models thus typically aim to reflect the real market.
For example, Bertrand-Edgeworth model [64] assumes a production limit of firms in
the Bertrand model. Various other factors can also be incorporated to avoid perfect
competition such as product differentiation, transport and search costs. Firms can
also avoid competing with each other by colluding/side contracting, which has often
been shown to improve the outcome, i.e., increase the sellers’ collective profit. Ex-
amples include Coase [19], which showed that bargaining leads to an efficient (profit-
maximizing) outcome in a trade with fully symmetric information and no transaction
cost, Jackson [42], which considered a two stage game where by firms first agree
on utility transfers that effectively rewrite the payoff functions, and then play the
price competition game in the second stage, and Ferreia[29], which considered cross-
ownership as a form of side contracting. Other examples can be found in [30, 28, 51].
Following this line of thought, in this chapter we consider the setting where mul-
tiple primary spectrum holders (also referred to as sellers) compete with each other
on the secondary market over multiple spectrum products. This market in its unreg-
ulated form is inefficient: all primaries will sell at marginal prices as discussed above.
We introduce a regulator who coordinates the sellers so that they avoid competition
by each focusing on different spectrum products/markets. This may be equivalently
viewed as forming an alliance/association of sellers who agree to abide by certain rules
without violating privacy and individual rationality. Specifically, we propose a money
transfer scheme where the seller transfers part of its profit each time it completes a
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transaction to other sellers, resulting in a profit sharing mechanism. The regulator
is not assumed to fully observe the sellers’ strategies (the details of the transactions
that have occurred such as the price, the bandwidth or duration sold, etc.), but only
assumed to know each time that a transaction has occurred. In other words, its role
is to simply to register/certify each transaction and facilitate the money transfer that
follows.
Under this model, we will discuss the conditions under which such a money ex-
change scheme could enforce efficient equilibria, i.e., profit maximizing. We will
specify the equilibrium region for both the special of two sellers and the more general
case of multiple sellers. In the first case we also identify the fairness region (in terms
of profit sharing) within the equilibrium region.
There is an interesting connection between our model and the class of coalition
games, which has been used in spectrum access context, see e.g., [61] that modeled
the collaborative spectrum sensing problem as a coalition game and showed that
through coalition, the secondary users can greatly reduce the average miss probability.
Under our model, the presence of the regulator may be viewed as forcing a coalition,
though ours is a non-cooperative game while coalition games belong to the family of
cooperative games. Moreover, since any kind of competition will result in zero profit
for all sellers, there is no other efficient equilibrium other than the grand coalition in
our context.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the model for
spectrum market in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we show that with two sellers and two
buyer types, the equilibrium only exists when price equals marginal cost. With the
introduction of a regulator, we show that an efficient equilibrium with fairness can be
achieved in certain conditions and fully characterize the conditions. In Section 4.4,
we extend the result of Section 4.3 to more than two buyer types. In Section 4.5 we




The model we present next is similar to the Bertrand model but extended to
multiple products catered to different buyer types with different spectrum needs. We
assume the sellers all have sufficient supply to support the buyers’ needs. Under this
assumption, similar to the Bertrand model the result would end in a price competition
and the only equilibrium point is when all sellers sell at their marginal prices. In
order to move the equilibrium to a more efficient (profitable) point, we introduce a
regulator who can force money transfers among sellers. This transfer is only based
on the occurrence of each transaction but not on the details of the transaction; thus
the resulting game is one of partial information.
4.2.1 Sellers
There are K sellers, each with sufficient spectrum resource to supply all products
if they want to. We assume there are N different types of buyers – as each type seeks
a distinct spectrum product, a buyer type is equated to a product in our exposition
– each having different spectrum needs. The different spectrum products can differ
in their leasing durations, bandwidths or access rights. We assume that this set of
products are known and well defined. A seller’s strategy then concerns the price at
which it sets for each product. Formally, its strategy space on RN is defined by the
set of prices corresponding to each spectrum product. The sellers’ goal is to maximize
the total profit generated from all products. If a spectrum product i is sold at price
pi, then its profit is pi − ci where ci is the unit cost of the i-th product.
75
4.2.2 Buyers
There are N types of buyers each corresponding to a spectrum product. A buyer i
will always choose to buy from the seller who offers the lowest price for product i given
that it is below some Mi. This amount Mi reflects buyer i’s price tolerance/upper
limit, beyond which the buyer will simply walk away. Mi can also be viewed as the
monopoly price for if there is only one seller, then the optimal price for the seller
would be Mi. Since there is a cost ci for each product i sold, the monopoly profit
from buyer type i is defined as Θi = Mi − ci. Let ri denote the number of buyers
of type i among the buyer population. Equivalently ri can also be the probability
of a random arriving buyers being of type i; this will not affect our analysis. Note
that the values Mi and ri are market information assumed known to the seller prior
to entering the market (this would be part of the market research done by the seller
mentioned earlier).
Throughout the chapter we will also often refer to a particular buyer type as
a distinct “market” featured with a distinct spectrum product, whenever there is
no ambiguity. This should not be confused with the more generic use of the word
“market” as in spectrum market.
4.2.3 Regulator
We define a third party in the sellers’ game, referred to as the regulator. This
regulator need not be imposed by entities outside the group of sellers; it could be
self-imposed by an alliance or coalition of sellers sharing the common goal of profit
maximization. The regulator can enforce money transfer based on partial information
of the actions of the sellers. Specifically, the regulator observes a signal each time
a transaction takes place (a buyer completing the purchasing of a spectrum product
from a seller). This signal contains no information of which product was sold and
what price it was sold at. The money transfer takes the following form. When seller
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i sells a product, he has to give another sellers j an amount tij (e.g., in dollars), for
each j 6= i. This amount tij is a real nonnegative number. Although we have set
up the regulator as a third party in the game, the role of the regulator can also be
viewed as a collusion between the sellers.
4.2.4 Efficiency
The intention in introducing the regulator is to force the sellers to avoid compe-
tition and attain higher profits. In this context, efficiency is measured by the total
profit of all sellers. Accordingly, at an efficient equilibrium the price that a buyer
pays for is the same as one commanded in a monopoly market. Thus, an efficient
equilibrium in our formulation maximizes the total profit of all sellers.
4.3 2 sellers, 2 buyer types
4.3.1 Unregulated
We begin with a simplified version of the spectrum market with only 2 sellers
and 2 buyer types, of population r1, r2, and monopoly profit Θ1,Θ2, respectively. As
already discussed in relation to the Bertrand model, under perfect competition, the
market will not exist with both sellers driven to selling for zero profit.
We next show that with some constraint on the sellers’ strategy space we can
achieve efficient (positive profit) equilibria. Specifically, assume that each seller can
only set one of the product prices below Mi meaning that they each can only choose
one of the products to sell. Let seller 1 (2) be assigned to take product 1 (2). Let’s also
include a third product which can attract both buyer types with less profit Θ3, i.e.,
(r1 + r2)Θ3 < r1Θ1 + r2Θ2. For this single-contract setup, deviation is not profitable
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for seller 1 if,
r1Θ1 ≥ r2Θ2 (4.1)
r1Θ1 ≥ (r1 + r2)Θ3 (4.2)
Equation (4.1) is for seller 1 to not take the market of seller 2, Eqn. (4.2) is for seller
1 to not choose to acquire both types of buyers by the third product (note that it
will not make sense for seller 1 to offer both product 1 and product 3 as a buyer, no
matter the type, will prefer product 3 as it is cheaper). Similarly,
r2Θ2 ≥ r1Θ1 (4.3)
r2Θ2 ≥ (r1 + r2)Θ3 (4.4)
would ensure seller 2 does not deviate. We don’t have to consider other cases because
if these conditions are satisfied, any price lower will not be beneficial to offer. For
these 4 equations to be satisfied, the set of parameters much satisfy the following
condition:
r1Θ1 = r2Θ2 ≥ (r1 + r2)Θ3 . (4.5)
If we assume r1 = r2 = 0.5, Θ3 = 1 and plot it on the Θ1-Θ2 plane, then the only
values for Θ1,Θ2 that satisfy this condition lie on the 45 degrees line starting from
Θ1 = Θ2 = 2. This will also be referred to as the stability or stable region of these
parameters. This example suggests that when each seller is limited to selling only
one product, it is possible for the market to exist whereby the sellers make non-zero
profit. However, such existence depends on very restrictive selections of the problem
parameters, e.g., a line out of a 2D plan in this example. In other words, it is all
but impossible for sellers to not compete, or to make a profit, in an unregulated
78
environment.











Figure 4.1: Stable region without regulation
4.3.2 With Regulation
Suppose that a seller, upon each completed sale, pays a certain amount of money
to its rival. Let’s denote by t1 (t2) the money given from seller 1 to 2 (2 to 1) when
seller 1 (2) sells. Then the incentive compatibility condition for staying with its
assigned market/product is rewritten as follows for seller 1:
r1(Θ1 − t1) + r2t2 ≥ r2(Θ2 − t1) (4.6)
r1(Θ1 − t1) + r2t2 ≥ r1(Θ1 − t1) + r2(Θ2 − t1) (4.7)
r1(Θ1 − t1) + r2t2 ≥ (r1 + r2)(Θ3 − t1) (4.8)
r1(Θ1 − t1) + r2t2 ≥ r2t2 (4.9)
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and for seller 2:
r2(Θ2 − t2) + r1t1 ≥ r1(Θ1 − t2) (4.10)
r2(Θ2 − t2) + r1t1 ≥ r1(Θ1 − t2) + r2(Θ2 − t2) (4.11)
r2(Θ2 − t2) + r1t1 ≥ (r1 + r2)(Θ3 − t2) (4.12)
r2(Θ2 − t2) + r1t1 ≥ r1t1 (4.13)
Note that we discarded the constraint where each seller can only sell to one buyer
type. Thus, there are 4 different scenarios for each seller: (i) to switch to the other
seller’s market (Eqn. (4.6)); (ii) to take the other seller’s market (Eqn. (4.7)); (iii) to
switch to the third product (Eqn. (4.8)); and (4) to give up its own market and just
receive money from the other seller (Eqn. (4.9)). We want to show that by choosing
appropriate t1 and t2, we can make staying with the assigned market the best strategy
of both sellers. Consider the extreme case where t1 = Θ1 and t2 = Θ2, then Eqns.
(4.6), (4.7), (4.10) and (4.11) are satisfied.
r1(Θ1 −Θ1) + r2Θ2 ≥ r2(Θ2 −Θ1) (4.14)
r2(Θ2 −Θ2) + r1Θ1 ≥ r1(Θ1 −Θ2) (4.15)
Also, note that Eqns. (4.8) and (4.12) can be rearranged as follows where maximizing
t1 and t2 makes the inequality the least binding/restrictive.
r2(t1 + t2) ≥ (r1 + r2)Θ3 − r1Θ1 (4.16)
r1(t1 + t2) ≥ (r1 + r2)Θ3 − r2Θ1 (4.17)
Θ1 and Θ2 are the largest values t1 and t2 can be. This is because they would rather
not give any contract if ti > Θi and Eqns. (4.9) and (4.13) will not be satisfied. This
means that if setting t1 = Θ1, t2 = Θ2 cannot allow all equations be satisfied, any other
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values of t1, t2 cannot allow the equations be satisfied. By setting t1 = Θ1, t2 = Θ2, we
know that the following equations are the conditions to check whether it is possible
to have any money transfer to cause both sellers to follow the assignment:
r1Θ1 − (r1 + r2)Θ3 + r2(Θ1 + Θ2) ≥ 0 (4.18)
r2Θ2 − (r1 + r2)Θ3 + r1(Θ1 + Θ2) ≥ 0 (4.19)
Solving for these two inequalities we have,






Taking the same example as in the previous subsection, r1 = r2 = 0.5 and Θ3 = 1,
we get Θ2 ≥ max(1− 0.5Θ1, 2(1−Θ1)) as shown in Fig. 4.2. The stable region now
contains all points above both lines.














Figure 4.2: Stable region under regulation
Comparing Figures 4.1 and 4.2, we observe that the stable region expanded from
a line to a plane, not to mention the elimination of the one-contract constraint. In
Figure 4.1, only the Θ values exactly on the line were possible for the market to exist
with positive profit, significantly limiting the type of spectrum products the market
can profitably sustain. By contrast, Figure 4.2 suggests that for a majority of the
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spectrum products there exists a money transfer mechanism that can separate the
markets between the sellers and enable positive and indeed, maximum profit.
4.3.3 Fairness
We have shown that the stable region can be expanded by introducing a regulating
money exchange without knowing what the sellers actually did. However, we have not
specified any constraints on the resulting profit share. It is conceivable that sellers
will only agree to this money transfer scheme if the profit earned is fair in some sense.
In what follows we consider not only the stability region but also the region where
fairness is achieved. Without loss of generality, we will assume r1 ≥ r2. Let’s consider
the additional fairness condition where both sellers obtain the same profit under the
money transfer t1, t2:
r1(Θ1 − t1) + r2t2 = r2(Θ2 − t2) + r1t1 (4.21)
The reason for using equality as the fairness criteria stems from the assumption that
all sellers have enough supply on their own so they have the same profit extraction
power.
Similar as before, if we maximize both t1 and t2 then Eqns. (4.6-4.13) become less
restrictive. Previously the maximums were Θ1,Θ2; however, now we cannot simply
use the maximum because t1 and t2 are coupled. We consider 2 cases.
1. Θ2 ≤ r1r2 Θ1: In this case, if we set t2 = Θ2, then t1 = Θ1/2 + r22r1 Θ2 ≤ Θ1 from
Eqn. (4.21). Since t1 ≤ Θ1, this is a valid choice that maximizes t1 and t2.
Using Eqns. (4.6) and (4.10), the following conditions have to be satisfied:
1 + r1/r2




Because we assumed r1 ≥ r2, we have 1+r1/r21−r2/r1 Θ1 ≥ r1r2 Θ1. The region is thus
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given by the following condition:
r1
r2
Θ1 ≥ Θ2 ≥ 1
(2 + r1/r2)
Θ1 . (4.23)
2. Θ2 ≥ r1r2 Θ1: Similarly we set t1 = Θ1 and obtain t2 = Θ2/2 + r12r2 Θ1 ≤ Θ2 from
Eqn. (4.21). Since t2 ≤ Θ2, this is a valid choice that maximizes t1 and t2.
Using Eqns. (4.6) and (4.10), we find the following condition:





≤ 0, the right hand side of the inequality is always satisfied.
We can conclude that fairness can be achieved in the region
(2 + r1/r2)Θ1 ≥ Θ2 ≥ r1
r2
Θ1 . (4.25)
Combining Eqns. (4.23) and (4.25), we conclude that the region where fairness is
achievable is,
(2 + r1/r2)Θ1 ≥ Θ2 ≥ 1
(2 + r1/r2)
Θ1 . (4.26)
Next consider the condition given by Eqns. (4.8) and (4.12).
1. Θ2 ≤ r1r2 Θ1: Let t1 = Θ1/2 + r22r1 Θ2, t2 = Θ2,
Θ2 ≥ (r1 + r2)Θ3 − r1Θ1/2
3r2/2 + r1
(4.27)




2. Θ2 ≥ r1r2 Θ1: Let t1 = Θ1, t2 = Θ2/2 + r12r2 Θ1,
Θ2 ≥ (r1 + r2)Θ3 − (3r1/2 + r2)Θ1
r2/2
(4.29)





Eqns. (4.26) and (4.27-4.30) characterize the entire region where fairness is achievable
by at least one (t1,t2) pair that also results in an efficient equilibrium.
Using the same example r1 = r2 and Θ3 = 1, we plot the region in Figure 4.3.
Here the solid lines correspond to Eqn. (4.26). Between the two solid lines is the















Figure 4.3: Fairness region
area where both fairness and efficiency can be achieved through money transfer. The
dashed lines correspond to Eqns. (4.27-4.30). If there exists the third product Θ3,
then the Θ1 and Θ2 values have to be above these lines. In Fig. 4.4 we further
show how the regions compare between efficient equilibrium and fair and efficient
equilibrium.
In this section, we showed that an efficient market can exist by introducing a
regulator. The money transfer provides the incentive for a seller not to steal her
rival’s market in two aspects: (i) money in-flow from the rival whenever she completes
a transaction, and (ii) additional money out-flow to the rival when the seller completes
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Figure 4.4: Comparing different regions
more transactions. We have shown that the stable/equilibrium region is maximized
when we maximize the money transfer. This is not to suggest that sellers should give
away all proceeds from a transaction; this is only done so as to reveal the largest
stable region. When conditions are less strict (given by the Θ1, Θ2 values), the
money transfer amount can be reduced. We compute the minimum transfer required
for each point on the Θ1-Θ2 plane and Fig. 4.5 shows the ratio between the minimum
transfer over the total profit ( t1+t2
Θ1+Θ2
). Note that this value is 1 at the boundary of
the achievable stable region and decreases in the middle where the value becomes 0.5,




Minimum Money Transfer (t1+t2)/(Θ1+Θ2)
 
 












Figure 4.5: Minimum transfer for fairness
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4.4 More than 2 buyer types
We now extend the result from the previous section and assume that there are
more than 2 buyer types but still with 2 sellers. The first problem we have to address
is how the buyer types might be divided among the sellers so that they can avoid
competition by selling in different markets as previously done.
4.4.1 Predetermined contract dividing sets
Theoretically, we could assign all contract types to one of the seller (say seller
1) and then transfer profit to the other seller (seller 2). Assume the contracts will
generate profits Θ1, ...ΘN respectively with type distribution r1, ..., rN . We can let
seller 1 have all the contracts and let t2 = ∞ such that seller 2 will never try to




the profit is divided equally
among the sellers. However, it is hardly reasonable or practical to let one seller do
all the work while the other does nothing and just collects money. We thus consider
whether it is possible to achieve an equilibrium if we have a pre-assigned dividing
rule for the contracts. Assume it is already determined that seller 1 should sell to
buyer types 11, 12, ..., 1N1 with profit Θ11,Θ12, ...,Θ1N1 and seller 2 should sell buyer
types 21, 22, ..., 2N2 to Θ21,Θ22, ...,Θ2N2 . Where N1, N2 are 2 positive integers with
N1+N2 = N The buyer distribution is r11, r12, ..., r1N1 and r21, r22, ..., r2N2 respectively.
Again, the transfer payment is incurred when a seller sells a spectrum product. The
transfer amounts are t1/t2 from seller 1/2 to seller 2/1. The following equations are
the profit of both sellers if they stick to the assigned contract allocations:
N1∑
i=1











If we write out all the deviations possible for each seller, there will be 2N12N2
possible strategies for each seller. We can however reduce the action space by the
following Lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Seller 1/2 will follow the contract assignment if and only if it is neither
valuable to drop one of her own contacts nor valuable to add one of her rival’s contracts
to her own contract set.
Proof. Changing from a set of contracts to another set of contracts can be viewed as
dropping some contracts and adding some contracts. The effects of these changes are
linear in the profit; thus, if changing the whole set is profitable then there must be
at least one profitable single change action. That also means if none of these changes
increases the total profit, the total profit cannot be increased by any combination of
these changes.
Lemma 4.1 says that if we want to check whether the assigned contract is a Nash
equilibrium, we only have to check dropping or adding one contract; we don’t have
to verify all possible strategies for the seller.
1. Drop a contract: The condition for seller 1 to not drop a contract 1j is
N1∑
i=1










which can be simplified to Θ1j ≥ t1. This means that seller 1 should needs to
have positive profit from selling this contract.















which can be simplified to t2 ≥ Θ2j − t1.
As previously mentioned, we analyze these condition as if a seller could take over the
rival’s market at the exact same price set by the rival, while in reality in order to
steal from the other’s market a seller needs to offer slightly lower prices. However,
the intention is that if the seller has no incentive to take over the rival’s market at the
same price, then she will have no incentive at any lower prices. Repeating the same
analysis for seller 2, the conditions that need to be satisfied such that an equilibrium
assignment exists are
Θ1j ≥ t1,∀j = 1, ..., N1 (4.33)
Θ2j ≥ t2,∀j = 1, ..., N2 (4.34)
t2 ≥ Θ2j − t1,∀j = 1, ..., N2 (4.35)
t1 ≥ Θ1j − t2,∀j = 1, ..., N1 (4.36)
If we just consider Eqns. (4.35) and (4.36), maximizing both t1 and t2 will relax
these two constraints. However, t1, t2 are restricted by Eqns. (4.33) and (4.33). Let
t1 = Θ1 = mini=1,...,N1 Θ1i and t2 = Θ2 = mini=1,...,N2 Θ2i be the maximum values of
t1 and t2. Then constraints Eqns. (4.35) and (4.36) can be simplified to:
Θ2 ≥ Θ2j −Θ1,∀j = 1, ..., N2 (4.37)
Θ1 ≥ Θ1j −Θ2, ∀j = 1, ..., N1 . (4.38)
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Let Θ1 = maxi=1...N1 Θ1i and Θ2 = maxi=1...N2 Θ2i. Then these constraints can be
further simplified to:
Θ2 ≥ Θ2 −Θ1 (4.39)
Θ1 ≥ Θ1 −Θ2 (4.40)
or
Θ1 + Θ2 ≥ max(Θ1,Θ2) = max Θ (4.41)
where max Θ is the highest profit among all contracts. In conclusion, the pre-
determined assignment of buyer types to the 2 sellers has to satisfy the condition
where the sum of the least profitable customer of each seller has to be greater than
the profit from the most profitable type. If this is satisfied, then an equilibrium where
both sellers follow the assignment is possible.
Figure 4.6: Stable regions for Θi separated to one of the sellers
In Fig. 4.6 we plot the regions where money exchange can force an efficient and
equal-share equilibrium in a 3-buyer type case. Here we fix Θ1 = 1 and vary Θ2 and
Θ3. Since there are 2 sellers dividing the 3 types, one of the sellers is assigned to
one buyer while the other is assigned to two buyers. We plot the possible regions of
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the 3 different assignments. The plot indicates which buyer type is assigned to be
the only buyer type for one of the sellers. The triangle is the area where there exists
an assignment that equal share is possible. The 3 assignments are all possible in the
middle area while only one assignment is possible in each corner of the triangle.
4.4.2 Proportional fairness
Now we generalize the results where we consider whether it is possible to achieve
a stable money transfer where the profit is divided among the sellers such that seller
1 gets p times the profit of seller 2. The proportional fairness is written as
∑
i






r2j(Θ2j − t2) +
∑
r1it1) (4.42)
Since t1 and t2 are coupled by Eqn. (4.42), only one of them can be set to Θi. Thus,







j r2j(Θ2j −Θ2) +
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r1iΘ1). Under this case,
t1 reaches Θ1 first when we increase t1 and t2. Thus, t2 cannot be set to Θ2.











t2 is determined by Eqn. (4.42). For this to be a valid choice, the conditions in
Eqns. (4.35) and (4.36) have to hold. That is t1 + t2 > Θ.
2.
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t2 = Θ2 (4.46)
and the same condition t1 +t2 > Θ has to hold to guarantee that an equilibrium
is feasible.
The calculated t1 and t2 will maximize the stable region; this means that if these
values cannot result in an equilibrium where both sellers follow the assignment, there
will be no other money transfer that can achieve an equilibrium.
4.4.3 Limited bandwidth/supply
Our assumption so far has been that both sellers have unlimited bandwidth to
compete in all markets at the same time. If the sellers have limited bandwidth,
their strategy spaces become subsets of the unlimited bandwidth condition. Thus, if
they do not deviate with unlimited bandwidth, they will not deviate when they have
bandwidth limit. Thus, we can apply our results to the following setup.
Assume that the bandwidth of the 2 sellers are limited at X1 and X2, respectively,
and they want to share profit proportional to the bandwidth each of them has. Since
the bandwidth is limited, if they want to collaborate they will only sell to the set of
markets with the highest profit per bandwidth. From a centralized view point, a water
filling algorithm can find the optimal set of markets in which they should sell. Then,
the problem becomes a subset sum problem to determine two subsets where each
subset of market requires X1 and X2 bandwidth. The subset sum problem is known
to be NP-complete. However, there are polynomial time approximating algorithms
that can get close to optimal solutions, see e.g., [33]. After determining the subset,
we can use Eqns. (4.43-4.46) to check whether there exists money exchange that is
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stable and achieves proportional fairness. If there is such a point, we then also know
what value the money transfer should be from the same set of equations.
This mechanism however requires the sellers to report truthfully about their band-
width (X1 and X2) at the beginning. There are a number of ways to address this
requirement.
1. We can show that the sellers do not have incentives to under report. Since the
share of the profit is proportional to the amount of bandwidth they reported, if
a seller under reports, she will get less profit for sure. The only possible scenario
is to under report and then sell the excess bandwidth to buyers not assigned
to her. Since the algorithm already assigns the most profitable buyer types to
either seller and there is no incentive to sell to the rival’s buyer types, the only
possible buyers are the ones that are not assigned, which means they present
lower profits. Thus, there is no incentive to under report the bandwidth.
2. Since the profit share is proportional to the bandwidth limit each of them re-
ports, the sellers may hope to increase her profit share by reporting higher than
the true bandwidth. However, this can be easily caught because the actual
transactions occurred will not match the assigned amount of contracts.
3. Another way of achieving truthful sharing is to use a VCG-like mechanism.
By designing the shared portion to be only related to the rival’s reported value.
However, without other side information (such as the sum of X1 +X2) the result
will become equally dividing the profit.
4.5 Multiple Sellers, Multiple Buyer Types
We now consider the more general case of multiple sellers with multiple buyer
types. Let the sellers be i = 1, ..., K, each assigned with Ni buyer types indexed
by i1, i2, ..., iNi. With regulation, a seller is forced to transfer tij to seller j if she
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Similar as in the previous sections, we only need to consider two types of devia-
tions, i.e., adding an additional contract or removing a contract. The condition for a




tij ≥ 0, ∀l = 1, ..., Ni (4.48)
tji ≥ Θjl −
∑
m 6=i
tim, ∀j 6= i,∀l = 1, ..., Nj (4.49)
The most restrictive condition in the first equation is the smallest Θil. We define Θi =
minl=1,...,Ni Θil and observe that
∑
j 6=i tij ≤ Θi is a necessary condition. Substituting
the maximum Θi into the second equation,
tji ≥ Θjl −Θi, ∀j 6= i,∀l = 1, ..., Nj . (4.50)
Similarly, tji has to be at least Θj − Θi for Eqn. (4.49) to be satisfied for all l. But




(Θi −Θj) ≥ 0, ∀l = 1, ..., Ni . (4.51)





(Θi −Θj), ∀i (4.52)
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is the necessary and sufficient condition such that there exists money transfers for the
regulation to ensure an efficient equilibrium corresponding to the contract allocation.
The money transfer from seller i to j, tji = Θj −Θi will maximize the stable region.
By the condition Eqn. (4.52) above, we notice a few factors that affect whether a
stable money transfer is possible: (i) large Θi is better; (ii) small Θi is better; (iii)
less number of sellers K is better. Combing (i) and (ii) we see that the it would be
desirable for most of the products to have profits close to each other and the products
assigned to each seller to have similar profits. From (iii) we note that as the number
of sellers increases, the summation on the right hand side of Eqn. (4.52) increases.
4.5.1 Limiting the money transfer tij = tij′
In this subsection, we consider the special case of limiting the money transfer
to be identical tij = tij′ ∀j, j′, ∀i. We get a similar set of equations on individual
rationality:
Θil − ti ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀l = 1, ..., Ni (4.53)
tj/(K − 1) ≥ Θjl − ti, ∀j 6= i, ∀l = 1, ..., Nj (4.54)
As before we get ti ≤ Θi and taking it into the second equation gives us
Θj/(K − 1) ≥ Θjl −Θi, ∀j 6= i,∀l = 1, ..., Nj (4.55)
Taking into account all possible l, we can rearrange and get the following necessary
and sufficient condition.
Θi ≥ (K − 1)(Θi −Θj), ∀i,∀j 6= i (4.56)
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Not surprisingly, the stability region shrinks compared to the previous subsection. As
we discussed in the previous section, the conditions are satisfied if profits of different
products are close to each other and the number of sellers are small.
4.5.2 Multiple seller each with one buyer type
From the previous results, we immediately obtain the result for the special case
where each seller is assigned with exactly one buyer type. The results can be obtained




K − 2 ∀i (4.57)
Θi ≤ K − 1
K − 2Θj ∀i, j (4.58)
Equation (4.57) is for any tij, while Eqn. (4.58) is for restricting tij = tij′ . We can
see that similar to the two-seller case, the conditions are that the profit differences
are not too far.
4.5.3 Multiple sellers with fairness
If we would also like to achieve fairness in a multiple seller setting, this would
require an additional set of equations to be satisfied. For example, if the proportional




















We note that combined with the set of conditions to not drop a contract or add a
contract (Eqns. (4.48), (4.49)), this is a feasibility problem of whether there exists a
set {tij} that can satisfy all constraints. Although there are no polynomial algorithm
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that can solve this problem, this is a simplified version of a linear programming
problem for which we do not have the maximization term. There are many existing
algorithms that could be used to solve this problem, see e.g., [23].
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced a competition model suitable for the secondary
spectrum market. We first show that the market will result in full competition where
equilibrium only exists when all sellers have zero profit. We then introduce a regulator
who can facilitate a set of money transfer based on partial observations of the sellers
actions. We show that by the introduction of this regulator, we can induce the market
to have efficient (profit maximizing) equilibria. The conditions for designing a stable
money transfer were characterized for cases of two-seller and multiple-seller cases,
and how to achieve fair profit share is also discussed.
96
CHAPTER V
Data-Driven Channel Modeling Using Spectrum
Measurement
5.1 Introduction
Dynamic spectrum access has been a subject of extensive study in recent years.
The increasing volume of literature calls for better understanding of the character-
istics of current spectrum utilization as well as better tools for analysis. A number
of measurement studies have been conducted recently, revealing previously unknown
features. On the other hand, analytical studies largely continues to rely on stan-
dard models like the two-state Markov (Gilbert-Elliot) model. In this chapter we
present an alternative, stochastic differential equation (SDE) based spectrum utiliza-
tion model that captures dynamic changes in channel conditions induced by primary
users’ activities.
The SDE model is in closed form, can generate spectrum dynamics as a temporal
process, and is shown to provide very good fit for real spectrum measurement data.
We show how synthetic spectrum data can be generated in a straightforward manner
using this model to enable realistic simulation studies. Moreover, we show that the
SDE model can be viewed as a more general modeling framework (continuous in
time and continuous in value) than commonly used discrete Markovian models: it
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is defined by only a few parameters but can be used to obtain the transition matrix
of any N -state Markov model. This is verified by comparing the 2-state GE model
generated by the SDE model and that trained directly from the data. We show that
the GE model is a good fit for the (quantized) data, thereby a fine choice when binary
descriptions of the channel condition is sufficient. However, when high resolution (in
channel condition) is needed, the SDE model is much more accurate than an N -state
model, and is much easier to train and store.
5.1.1 Related work
One commonly used category of channel models that obtain the time process
property is based on Markov chains, where each state often represents a different
condition of the channel, with dynamic changes described by the state transition
probability matrix. Sometimes a mixture of Markov models with other models is
used to capture characteristics of the error patterns, see e.g., the chaotic maps [49]
and the MTA [48].
Within this category, the Gilber-Elliott (GE) model [34, 27] is the simplest Markov
model consisting of only two states. Perhaps due to its simplicity (and often the
associated analytical tractability), the GE model is widely used as the underlying
model for wireless channels both in analysis and in simulation. Under this model,
the channel is given by a two-state Markov chain with state G (good) and B (bad),
see Figure 5.6. In state G, transmission is assumed error-free, while in state B the
channel has a probability h of transmitting the packet correctly1. These two states
are used to model a burst-noise channel. A more general variation of this model
includes a probability k (usually k > h) such that both good and bad states have a
chance to generate an error bit.
A lot of studies have been conducted on these two-state Markov models. Mc-
1The GE model is very often used in a simplified version where h = 0, which is the version we







Figure 5.1: The Gilbert-Elliott (2-state) model
Dougall et al. [54] showed that at low SNR, the two-state Markov model does not
generate an adequate frame error process because it lacks the ability to match higher-
order block error statistics. Hartwell et al. [37] showed that using the higher-order
state hidden Markov models provides a better fit of measured data than the tradi-
tional 2-state GE models. However, high-order state Markov models require high
computational complexity to train the parameters of the Markov model. Yu et al.
[73] proposed a four-state Markov model and showed how to analytically establish
the transition probability. Konrad et al. [48] proposed a Markov based model aimed
at capturing the non-stationary behaviors of wireless channels.
5.1.2 Our approach and main contributions
We introduce a stochastic differential equation (SDE) model derived partly based
on the physics of electromagnetic wave propagation. This SDE model is continuous
both in time and in value, and falls under the category of diffusion models, which
is more commonly used in queuing analysis when dealing with large systems, e.g.,
those with heavy loads [36]. The main idea is that when queue sizes are large, the
increments over a single discrete step become relatively small by comparison. Thus
under such operating regimes, it is reasonable to model the discrete change in the
queue occupancy by a continuous flow, resulting in diffusion models. The analytical
advantage of using a diffusion model is that it is amenable to both transient and
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steady state analysis and can be used to derive queue size distributions which is hard
to do using a discrete model when the state space is large. We shall see that the
SDE model introduced here holds similar advantages over discrete, GE-type models.
We therefore conclude that the SDE model serves as a valuable alternative to the
commonly used GE-type models.
5.1.3 Organization
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the SDE
model and show how to estimate its parameters in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3 we
verify the model by using spectrum measurement data from CRAWDAD [39] as well
as our own study [16]. In Section 5.4 we show how to synthesize data from the trained
SDE model and compare the spectral entropy of the synthesized data to the spectral
entropy of the collected data. Then in Section 5.5 we show that we can obtain the
2-state GE model from the synthesized data and compare it with the GE model
trained directly from the quantized measurement data. In Section 5.6 we compare
the channel prediction performance of the SDE model and an N -state Markov model,
both trained from the measurement data. We conclude the chapter in Section 5.7.
5.2 The SDE model
5.2.1 Constructing the model
The spectrum utilization model presented here uses stochastic differential equa-
tions (SDE) to model dynamic scattering and multipath fading channels, in particular,
Rayleigh-distributed stationary channels. This is a technique developed and used in
a number of studies, see e.g., [66, 13].
Specifically, our model is derived from a dynamic wireless channel model developed
in [65] using similar techniques. Underlying this model is the assumption of either a
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single transmitter or many non-dominant transmitters stationary in space and in time.
The model describes the complex signal received by a stationary receiver (thus with
zero Doppler’s effect) Building upon this work, our contribution lies in (1) extracting
the received energy as a random process expressed as an SDE and the construction
of the subsequent spectrum model, and (2) developing a method to estimate the
unknown parameters of the model.
In this model the signal detected at a receiver is viewed as a collection of a large
number of reflected waves, and thus exhibits a multipath propagation phenomenon.
This makes the received signal’s phase random and hard to predict, and can possibly
lead to large fluctuation in the received power. Assuming that the received signal
on each path is random, the model developed in [65] is based on a continuous time
description of the scattered electric field received at a stationary receiver with multi-





(k)(t)], where ak is
the amplitude of the received signal along path k and i is the square root of -1. The
phase factors exp[iϕ(k)(t)] are independent and uniformly distributed on a unit circle
in the complex plane and for each t. In addition, it is assumed that the phase ϕ(k)(t)
satisfies the following SDE: dϕ(k)(t) = B
1
2dW (k)(t), where ϕ(k)(0) are uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 2pi), W (k) are independent Weiner processes, and B is a constant that
represents the rate of change in the phase of the received signal. By integrating the
above SDE it is readily seen that VAR(ϕ(k)(t)− ϕ(k)(0)) = Bt.
Using stochastic calculus, it was established in [65] that the amplitude process is
given by Ψ(t) = I(t) + iQ(t), where I(t) and Q(t) are the in phase and quadrature



















2dW (Q)(t) , (5.2)
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with I(0) = 0, Q(0) = 0, and W (I)(t) and W (Q)(t) two independent standard Wiener
processes. The parameter B makes these two SDEs mean-reverting, i.e., the pro-
cess, in equilibrium, approaches the mean [9]. Such processes are also referred to
as Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes [9]. The parameter σ2 represents the stationary
magnitude of the scattering power averaged over an asymptotically large number
of propagation paths [65], and is shown to be the asymptotic (in t) variance of t











The above summarizes what was developed in [65]. We now proceed to derive
the power process received at the receiving antenna at time t. This is given by
R(t) =
√
I2(t) +Q2(t). Assuming processes (5.1) and (5.2), and using standard
arguments from stochastic calculus [9], we have the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. Let I¯(t) = e
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Proof. Let f(x, t) = e
1
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Bt and fxx =
∂2f
∂2x
= 0. Using Ito’s formula (Theorem 4.2.3 [9]) and replacing x with I(t), we have



































where we have substituted Eqn (5.1) for dI(t). The second, Eqn (5.4), can be obtained
by the same argument. Integrating, say the equation for I¯(t), we see that


















BsdW (I)(s) is zero and its variance
∫ t
0
eBsds we get the result.
An immediate consequence of the above lemma is that
R¯(t) =
√
I¯(t)2 + Q¯(t)2 (5.5)




(eBt − 1). The main theorem is given
as follows:














with R(0) = r0, some constant, and W a standard Wiener process.




the function f(x, y) =
√





























Substituting the above into Ito’s formula when differentiating (5.5), and using stan-
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has the same law as a Wiener process, denoted as W (t), independent of W (I) and














































Replacing dR¯(t) with (5.8) in the above equation gives the desired result.














2dW (t) . (5.10)
The additional term Bµ
2
dt on the RHS, which is now part of the mean reverting term,
has the effect of steering the mean of the process to approximately µ (at t→∞). To
summarize, our model given in (5.10) consists of three terms: first a “mean reverting”
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process (or the O-U process) with mean µ, the second the “radial” term, and the third
a volatility term (together a Bessel process). Using the terminology of [1], we will
call this process a Radial Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
Three unknown parameters uniquely define this model: µ, B, and σ. µ will be
referred to as the mean. B will be referred to as the phase constant; it corresponds
to the rate at which the received signal phase changes. σ2 will be referred to as the
power constant (not to be confused with the received power); it is the sum of signal
magnitudes over all paths. The value Bσ2 determines the volatility of this process.
In the next section, we will show how these three parameters can be estimated using
spectrum measurement data for training.
5.2.2 Parameter estimation
In order to estimate the three unknowns µ, B and σ from real measurement data,























Note that the left hand side of the above equation is now a zero-mean, unit-variance
normally distributed random variable. The idea behind our parameter estimation
procedure is to use real measurement data to generate data points corresponding to
the right hand side of Eqn (5.11), and then match the first two (or more) sample
moments to that of the 0-mean unit-variance normal distribution, thereby solving
three unknowns (µ,B, σ).
Specifically, for a given frequency band our measurements are in the form of a
time series of power readings, denoted as Rˆ(ti), i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N . From these mea-
surements we can now obtain successive differences between these readings, denoted
as dRˆ(ti) = Rˆ(ti) − Rˆ(ti−1), i = 1, 2, · · · , N . We can also obtain the differences in
106
sampling times, denoted as dti = ti−ti−1, i = 1, 2, · · · , N . For our measurement data,
sampling times are evenly spaced. Therefore in our case dti is treated as a constant.
Following this, the original measurement data may be viewed as a collection of
N triples (Rˆ(ti), dRˆ(ti), dti), i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Each such triple will now be referred
to as a sample within the context of estimation and testing. From this collection of
samples, we now select a random subset Nest of size Nest for estimation. We plug in
each selected sample into the RHS of Eqn (5.11) and obtain the following data point





















This gives us a total of Nest data points {wˆi, i ∈ Nest}, each a function of µ, B




three unknown parameters can now be estimated by matching (1) the sample mean
of the data set {wˆi, i ∈ Nest} to 0; (2) its sample variance to 1; (3) the parameter µ
to the mean estimate µˆ; That is, the parameters are estimated by matching the first
two sample moments to the first two moments of the 0-mean unit-variance normal
distribution and matching the parameter µ to the estimated mean of the received
power.




(m1 − 0)2 + (m1/22 − 1)2 +
(µ− µˆ)2
µ2
+ P + (m
1/3
3 − 0)2 + (m1/44 − 31/4)2
where mi denotes the i-th sample moment of the data set {wˆi, i ∈ Nest}, and 0 and 1
are the first two moments of the standard Normal distribution. P is a penalty term
designed to penalize the minimization when the parameter B is negative or too close
to zero (note that in the process R(t), B is a positive term). The term is in the form
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of P = C(B − δ)2 when B < δ and P = 0 when B ≥ δ (where δ is a small number
and δ, C > 0).
Once these parameters are estimated, we use the remaining N −Nest samples for
testing and model verification. This is done in a very similar way as in estimation.
Specifically, the testing samples are also plugged into the RHS of Eqn (5.11). However,
this time the computation is done with the estimated values of µ, B and σ. This gives
us N − Nest data points, also commonly referred to as the residual of the test data.
The model verification test lies in checking whether the residual follows the standard
normal distribution.
5.2.3 Analytical expression of SDE distribution
An immediate application of the SDE model is to derive received power distri-
bution in a channel. As mentioned earlier, the SDE model belongs to the family of
diffusion models. Diffusion models are often used in large-scale queuing systems as
good alternatives to the discrete valued Markov chains. Specifically, by allowing the
queue to have continuous values, the discrete valued Markov chain can be approxi-
mated by a diffusion model with the appropriate parameters. This makes it feasible
to derive the steady state distribution of the queue analytically, which is otherwise
impossible under a discrete model. Below we use similar techniques to obtain the
steady state distribution of the power process.
For any stochastic differential equation of the form
dXt = U(Xt, t)dt+
√
2D(Xt, t)dWt, (5.13)
the distribution of the process f(x, t), where f(x, t) denotes the probability P (Xt =
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x), satisfies the following equality by using the Fokker-Planck equation [36]:
∂
∂t
f(x, t) = − ∂
∂x
[U(x, t)f(x, t)] +
∂2
∂x2
[D(x, t)f(x, t)] . (5.14)
In our SDE model, R(t), the power process, takes the role of Xt in Eqn (5.13).












dW (t) , (5.15)







D(Xt, t) = σ
2B/4
Assuming that the process reaches a steady state, i.e., ∂
∂t
f(x, t) = 0. Then integrating



















Integrating the above over x we get
2
σ2
(µx− x2/2) + log x = log f(x) + c . (5.18)
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Rearranging to solve for f(x) we get,
f(x) = c · x · exp( 2
σ2
(µx− x2/2)) , (5.19)
and the normalizing constant value c = 1/
∫∞
0
x · exp( 2
σ2
(µx − x2/2)). This gives us
the complete description of the steady state distribution function of the power process
R(t).
5.3 Model verification using spectrum measurement data
The model verification uses spectrum data from two sources: (1) The first is
our measurement study reported in [16], which was done over a period of multiple
days continuously, and simultaneously at multiple locations. The resolution of the
measurement is such that one energy reading (in µV) is produced for each band of
width 200KHz, for roughly every 75 seconds of sweep time over the range of 20MHz
to 3GHz. (2) The second is a dataset obtained from crawdad.org [39]. Compared to
the first data set, this set consists of readings for a larger band (10MHz), but over
a much smaller sweep time of roughly 80 nano seconds. These two sets of data thus
represent two very different measurement regimes: the first has low time resolution
(sampling rate) but high spectral resolution (narrow bandwidth) while the second has
a much higher sampling rate but wider bandwidth.
From these two data sets we selected the bands of TV Digital and TV Analog
for training and verifying the SDE model. The center frequencies of these bands
are listed in table 5.1. For each data set (note that each set is now a collection of
samples (triples) as described in the previous section), we randomly select 50% to be
the estimation/training data set and the remaining 50% the testing data set2.
To check whether the residual follows a standard normal distribution, and in
2Randomly selecting a set for estimation is a standard procedure in statistical analysis; the
resulting estimation represents the data better in case the underlying process is non-stationary.
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Data Set MHz Primary user Source
1 518 TV measurement study [16]
1 738 TV measurement study [16]
1 1842 GSM measurement study [16]
2 551 TV CRAWDAD [39]
2 629 TV CRAWDAD [39]
2 665 TV CRAWDAD [39]
Table 5.1: Data sets for model verification
particular to check how far it is from the standard normal distribution, we employ
the Quantile-Quantile(Q-Q) plot, a commonly used graphical statistical tool, see e.g,
[11, 14, 18]. The quantiles are points taken at regular intervals from the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of a random variable. The p-quantile for a random
variable X is the value x such that Prob(X < x) = p. A Q-Q plot shows the
quantiles of the first data set against the quantiles of the second data set, and is
therefore an intuitive (as well as visual) and efficient way to determine if two data
sets follow a common distribution.
For two random data sets S1 and S2, the Q-Q plot is generated by first sorting
each set in increasing order, and then sequentially placing points on the plot. The
i-th point is placed at coordinates (s1i , s
2




i are the values of the i-th
data point in the sorted sets S1 and S2, respectively.
In order to check whether a data set follows a standard normal distribution, we will
make the first data set the theoretical quantiles of the standard normal distribution
and the second data set the residual of the test data on the Q-Q plot. If the points fall
along a 45-degree reference line, then it is strong evidence that the residual follows
the standard normal distribution. If the points fall along a line, but not the reference
line, then this suggests that the residual follows normal distribution but is not exactly
standard.
In Figure 5.2 we show results on the first data set [72]. As noted earlier, this data
set has a much coarser time resolution, with 72 seconds between two consecutive
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Test data for location 2, 10am−11am, 518MHz



















Test data for location 2, 10am−11am, 738MHz























Test data for location 2, 10am−11am, 1842MHz
Figure 5.2: Q-Q plot, location 2, 10-11am: 518MHz (top), 738MHz (middle), and
1842MHz (bottom) from [72]
data points (as apposed to 78 nano seconds of the second data set). The dashed
line represents the best linear fit of the points (the residual) – the closer the points
are to the dashed line, the more normally distributed the residual is. The solid line
represents the 45-degree reference line.
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Test data for Freq 551MHz





















Test data for Freq 629MHz





















Test data for Freq 665MHz
Figure 5.3: Q-Q plot, 551MHz (top), 629MHz (middle), 665MHz (bottom)
Figure 5.3 shows the above normality test results for the three frequencies in the
second data set. It can be seen that in all three cases the points have very good linear
fit, indicating strong normality of the residuals. In addition, all three dashed lines
are very close to the reference line, indicating the residuals follow close-to-standard
normal distributions.
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We observe that the data acquired from CRAWDAD and in [72] both fit really
well but the CRAWDAD data fits better because the residuals in Fig. 5.3 fall more
linearly on the 45-degree reference line. The reason is likely due to the fact that the
second data set has a better time resolution. For the first data set, the fit is also good
with the exception of 1842MHz The reason that the model fails in this case is because
when calibrating the data, we assumed that the whole set (Monday-Friday) comes
from the same process which has the same three parameter values. Unfortunately,
this set contains an out-lier – one of the days has a mean significantly lower than the
other four (see Section 5.4 for more detail). Overall, these results verify that the SDE
model can be applied to both sparse and fine sampling rates of data.
Along with the fitting result, Table 5.2 shows the values of the estimated param-
eters; these values can be used in synthesizing spectrum utilization data, described
in the next section.
Data Set MHz µ b σ
1 518 0.3785 0.0391 0.0327
1 738 0.9661 0.0383 0.0732
1 1842 3488.0 0.0297 894.29
2 551 144.5060 1.2606e+07 93.1635
2 629 234.4078 1.5509e+07 124.3106
2 665 226.9313 1.7845e+07 145.8981
Table 5.2: Trained parameters
5.4 Synthesizing spectrum data
An important reason for developing any channel model is to provide a way to
generate synthetic channel data (sample paths of energy levels in a channel) that
are statistically close to variations observed in a real channel, so that one can easily
generate a realistic “spectrum environment” in which to test and evaluate various
algorithms and protocols. Below we show such synthetic data can be easily generated
under our SDE model.
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Taking Eqn (5.10) and integrating over a small interval ,
R(t+ )−R(t) = Bµ
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2 (W (t+ )−W (t)) (5.20)
where the approximation holds when  is sufficiently small. Assuming we start from
some initial condition R(to) at time to, we can generate a sequence of data R(to + k)
at times to + k for k = 1, 2, · · · with time resolution (or time step) of  as follows.
Note that W (t+ )−W (t) is normally distributed with zero mean and variance .
1. Generate a random sample from the 0-mean -variance normal distribution;
denote it by W (to + )−W (to).
2. Take this sample value into Eqn (5.20), replacing the corresponding part in the
last term on the RHS.
3. Compute the RHS, which gives the difference between R(to+) and R(to), hence
we have generated a value for R(to + ).
4. Now repeat the above procedure indefinitely to produce a time series of desired
length.
The end result of this procedure is a sequence of synthesized R(t) values, representing
a particular realization.
To verify the validity of the above approach, one needs to verify that sample paths
(i.e., the synthesized R˜(t) process) generated by the above synthesis procedure follow
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the same distribution as the actual sample paths collected (i.e., the measured Rˆ(t)
process). However, directly comparing sample paths is not a very meaningful exercise.
It is also not clear how to extract the underlying distribution from these sample paths
since we are dealing with random processes.
To overcome these difficulties, we take the following approach. We first use the
synthesis procedure to generate a large number of sample paths and from these we
calculate the x% quantiles for each time t, where x = 5, 40, 60, 95. We then inspect
how well the real measurement traces fit into these quantiles.
Figure 5.4 shows this comparison result for the one-hour traces collected during
10-11am at location 2. The synthetic sample paths are generated using parameters
estimated by randomly selecting 50% of the data collected during this hour on the first
five days (Monday-Friday), and the actual sample path is whole set of data collected
during this hour. In these figures the dense curves represent (from bottom up) the
5%, 40%, 60%, and 95% quantiles from the synthetic data3. The narrow lines running
in between are where the real data points lie. In the case of 518MHz and 738MHz,
almost all the real observations are within the range between 5−95% quantiles. This
shows that the synthesized data and the collected data are more or less consistent.
In the case of 1842MHz, there is one path of data lying below the 5% quantile.
This observation tells us that the synthetic data does not describe the data correctly,
which agrees with the Q-Q plot analysis in the previous chapter (Figure 5.2). The
reason that the model fails is because when calibrating the data, we assumed that
the whole set(Monday-Friday) comes from the same process which has the same three
parameters. Unfortunately, one of the days has a mean obviously lower than the other
four. This tells us that we have to be cautious when the Q-Q plot analysis does not
result in straight line.
3These quantile curves are much denser (higher temporal resolution) than the actual measurement
because in synthesis we are able to choose very small time steps , at 1 second; indeed the smaller
this step the more accurate the approximation in (5.20). On the other hand, the actual measurement
has a time resolution around one reading per 70 seconds, as mentioned earlier.
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Figure 5.4: Location 2, 10-11am, 518MHz (top), 738MHz (middle) and
1842MHz(bottom). In each figure the dense curves represent (from
bottom up) the 5%, 40%, 60%, and 95% quantiles from the synthetic
data.
We can also compare the entropy of the two sample paths as an additional, indirect
means of validating the SDE model.. The experiment is done by choosing a sliding
window of size 10000 (samples). Within this window, we compute the power spectral
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density of the samples, from which we then compute the entropy of the samples within
this window. We do this over the entire sequence with overlapping of 50% between
windows.
















































Figure 5.5: Entropy of synthesized SDE and data (551MHz top, 629MHz middle,
665MHz bottom)
Figure 5.5 shows the results of the above comparison with measurement data. It
can be seen that the entropy measures of the two are very close in all cases (they also
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both remain steady throughout the entire sequence).
5.5 SDE as a generalization of the GE model
In this section we show that the SDE model can be used to generate a 2-state GE
model; furthermore, this GE model is virtually identical to that generated directly
from the data. This in some sense validates the synthetic data generated by the SDE
model through yet another means, and at the same time shows that the SDE model
may be viewed as a more general modeling framework.
5.5.1 Generating the GE model
Given a sample path (measured or synthesized) of continuous power levels, the
discrete GE model may be generated by quantizing/discretizing the data into binary
values (where 0 represents a bad channel condition/state and 1 a good channel con-
dition/state). Using guidelines from [15], this discretization is done by viewing the
channel as occupied when the received power exceeds the minimum received power
(observed in the same sample path) by more than 3dB. Both the measurement data
and the synthetic data are already discrete in time, but can be easily down-sampled
to obtain a desired time resolution.
We then compute the ratio between how many times BB and BG (respectively
GG and GB) transitions occurred over the quantized sample paths, and use this as
the estimate for the transition probability ratio PBB/PBG (respectively PGG/PGB).
This ratio together with the fact the PBG = 1 − PBB (respectively PGB = 1 − PGG)








Figure 5.6: The Gilbert-Elliott (2-state) model
5.5.2 Comparison between data-generated GE and SDE-generated GE
The following experiment is performed on the sample paths collected at 551, 629,
and 665 MHz, respectively:
1. Train the parameters of the SDE using this data set.
2. Synthesize data from this trained SDE model.
3. Quantize the synthesized data trace to 0-1 binary value as described above.
4. Obtain a GE model from the discretized synthetic data also as described above.
5. Obtain a second GE model directly from the original set of sample paths, sim-
ilarly quantized.
We then compare these two GE models, the idea being that if the two are similar,
then the SDE model can also be used to generate a valid GE model. The comparison
results are listed in Table 5.3.
Data Set MHz GE from data GE from SDE
PBG PGG PBG PGG
1 551 0.6489 0.6494 0.6350 0.6201
2 629 0.6506 0.6499 0.6427 0.6221
3 665 0.6151 0.6439 0.6615 0.5970
Table 5.3: Data sets for model verification
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We see that the two GE models share very similar parameters. This indicates
two things. Firstly, since the two GE models are generated from the synthetic and
the measurement data, respectively, this similarity suggests that the synthetic and
the measurement data are very similar in nature, thereby validating the SDE model
as a means of generating realistic synthetic data. Secondly, this means that we can
use the SDE model to generate essentially equivalent GE models without having to
rely on the original measurement data, i.e., once the SDE model has been trained,
we only need to record the three parameters µ, b, σ for future use. In this sense the
SDE model may be viewed as a more general modeling framework.
It is also worth noting that the GE model, i.e., its parameters, can be calculated
directly from the SDE model, given the threshold, Th, used to quantize the data.
Specifically, since we know the steady state distribution from Section 5.2.3, by ob-
serving that the SDE model consists of a deterministic term and a normal distribution,




















i.e., PGG is calculated by integrating the distribution of the power process being
below the threshold multiplied by the probability that the next step falls below the
threshold. The same can be done for PBB. This method allows us to directly obtain
the GE model from the SDE model without having to go through the synthetic data.
This method can be extended to any N -state Markov model and will be used in
Section 5.6.
5.5.3 Fitting performance of the GE model
Following the previous section, it would be natural to question how well the GE
model fits the data if we only consider the quantized, binary description of the channel.
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In this section we examine this by comparing (1) the autocorrelation of the sample
paths generated by the GE model and the quantized actual data, and (2) the run
length distribution of error and error-free runs/sequences observed in these samples.
We first compare the autocorrelation and power spectrum density of the actual
data (data set 1, quantized) and the sample paths generated by the GE model. The
estimated GE transition probabilities from good state to bad state and good state
staying in good state are PGB = 0.3506 and PGG = 0.6494. The transition probabili-
ties starting from the bad state are PBB = 0.3511 and PBG = 0.6489. Results for the









Real Data 300s duration








2−state Model 300s duration
τ (seconds)
Figure 5.7: The autocorrelation of real data and the GE model over a 300-second
duration.
The figures show that the autocorrelation and power spectral density of the GE
model matches the actual discretized data samples very well with similar maximum
values and similar shapes.
Next we examine the length of consecutive available states (consecutive ‘1’s) and
consecutive unavailable states (consecutive ’0’s). Figure 5.9 (left) shows the distri-
bution of consecutive runs of availability. The x-axis is the run length plotted in
logarithm scale, and the y-axis is the proportion of runs of that length. We observe
122





Power Spectral Density of Real Data





Power Spectral Density of 2−state
Frequency (Hz)
Figure 5.8: The power spectral density of real data and the GE model over a 300-
second duration.
that the GE model generates run lengths of both error and error-free close to the
actual data.
The autocorrelation and the error length show that the GE model fits the actual
data really well, suggesting that the GE model is a good choice when the discretized
binary representation of the channel condition is sufficient. In other words, if an
application only needs to observe whether the channel is in a good quality, the GE
model is more or less adequate. This however is no longer the case if we require higher
resolution. In the next section, we demonstrate that when we need more information
than just discretized binary values, the SDE model provides much more richness.
5.6 Predictive performance of the SDE model
One obvious advantage of having a continuous model like SDE is the richness
of the data it provides compared to a discrete (esp. binary) model like GE. In this
section we take a closer look at this aspect within the context of the respective model’s
ability to predict channel conditions. In many applications including channel-aware




















Real data E[X]=1.54 σ=0.91

















Real data E[X]=2.85 σ=2.39
GE E[X]=2.85  σ=2.31
Figure 5.9: Comparison between the SDE and GE models: consecutive available run
length (left) and consecutive occupied run length (right)
predicting channel condition (or channel side information (CSI) in some contexts) is
often critical to the effectiveness of the overall mechanism. For these applications, we
often wish to obtain information more than just the binary value representing whether
the channel is occupied. This is so that we could, for instance, more accurately
calculate the SNR from the interference power to estimate the achievable transmission
throughput.
Below we examine a channel model’s ability to predict, in a discrete-time setting,
the received power of the next step given the current power level. We do so for the
SDE model, and an N -state Markov model, a more general version of the 2-state GE
model which allows us to adjust the resolution (the size of the state space N) and
the corresponding quantization error.
We use the data-generated SDE model as a channel prediction model and compare
it with the prediction of anN -state Markov model. Since both models have Markovian
behavior, knowing the current state is sufficient to predict the next state. The error
of the prediction model is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the
prediction and the actual value. Given the past values of a process, the SDE model
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satisfies the Markovian property and predicts the next time step purely on the current
power value:
















2 (W (t+ )−W (t)) . (5.22)
Notice that only the last term contributes to a stochastic value with mean 0 and vari-
ance ; all other terms are deterministic. If our metric is the absolute loss |prediction
value − actual value|, then the best prediction is to predict the expected value. The
expected value is obtained by discarding the stochastic terms and leaving only the
deterministic terms. Thus, in this comparison we will use eqn. 5.23 as the SDE model
prediction.












For the N -state Markov model, we take the first 200000 sample points from the
CRAWDAD data for training. The N -state Markov model requires a quantization
of different power levels. The quantization level is determined by dividing the sorted
200000 sample points into N levels; all points are quantized into the mean value of
the level it is placed in. We can then construct the N -state transition probability
matrix from the transitions of the 200000 data points between the quantile levels.
It is worth noting that the SDE model only requires several hundred of sample
points for training to obtain the 3 parameters (µ, b, σ) while the N -state Markov
model requires at least two orders of magnitude (100x) more in the number of train-
ing samples. Also, the N -state Markov model requires N × N storage to hold the
transition probability matrix.
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Figure 5.10: Average error obtained using Markov models of different number of
states compared with SDE



















Figure 5.11: Average error obtained using Markov models of different number of
states compared with SDE
Figure 5.10 shows the average prediction error of the N -state Markov model for
N ∈ [1, 10000]. Compared with the SDE model, we can see that the N -state Markov
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model is not very useful in prediction when N is small, but can achieve predictions
close to the SDE model by trading space for accuracy. Figure 5.11 shows the same
result but replacing CRAWDAD data by SDE generated sample path. As expected,
since it is actually generated from the SDE model, the SDE model predicts the power
levels even more accurately. This error value is actually the average deviation of the
last term in equation 5.22.
We next show the prediction performance over multiple time steps. We fix the
number of states for the Markov model, but vary the prediction steps n from 1 to
37. The prediction of the Markov model is done by multiplying the transition matrix
of the Markov model by it self for n times. Assuming the trained transition matrix
is correct, this will give the correct n step transition probability matrix. Prediction
under the SDE is done by recursively plugging in Equation 5.23 for n times. The
results are shown in Fig. 5.12.





















Figure 5.12: Average error obtained using a 1000-state Markov model and SDE for
n-step prediction.
We see that the SDE clearly outperforms under all step sizes. The error accu-
mulates when we increase the prediction steps, but this saturates to a near-constant
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value when the step is larger than 5. This is most likely because after 5 steps the
dependency of the future power level on the current value becomes negligible, so that
the prediction of both models become the steady state value.
It should be mentioned that one of the main reasons that contributed to the error
under the Markov prediction model is the training process it takes to obtain the
transition matrix – the measurement data we have appears insufficient in volume for
this purpose when N is large. We thus conduct the following, improved experiment.
We first use the SDE model to directly calculate the transition probabilities as shown
earlier, so as to minimize this training error. This would be equivalent to training
the Markov model using very long data traces. We then compare the prediction
performance of the SDE and this more accurateN -state model over a synthetic sample
path; the results are shown in Figure 5.13. We see that the error of the Markov
model is reduced even with small state space N . Note that when N is sufficiently
large, the Markov model can predict slightly better than the SDE does. This is
because under the Markov model we are truly calculating the probability of multi-
step transitions whereas under the SDE model we recursively calculate the mean
which is only an estimate. The improvement is, however, very minor, and comes at
enormous computational expense4
We end this section by highlighting a further advantage of the SDE model, which
is flexibility. This can be seen in two aspects: (1) suppose the training data have
measurements measured at nonuniform or random times. In this case it would be
hard or even impossible to use this data to train a simple N -state Markov model
because the transition of the Markov model is at a fixed time step. (2) If the we
want to change the discrete time unit of the Markov model, we would need to either
retrain the model (in the case of upsampling), or perform matrix multiplication (in
the case of down-sampling and only feasible when the new time unit is an integer
4Again, note that we actually had to use the SDE model to generate the N -state model for lack
of sufficient training, so this comparison would not have been possible without the SDE model!
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Figure 5.13: Markov model obtained from SDE model
multiple of the current one). In contrast, the SDE model does not require a uniformly-
sampled training data. Recall that in Section 5.2.2, the training is done with the triple
(Rˆ(ti), dRˆ(ti), dti) where dti can be any real number. In addition, once we obtain the
SDE model it is very easy to select/adjust the desired time resolution by choosing
the Brownian motion term with the corresponding  in Equation 5.20 without having
to retrain the model.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced a stochastic differential equation (SDE) model to
describe the secondary wireless channel power and compared it with N -state Markov
models. We show that the SDE model fits spectrum measurement data very well
under different measurement regimes. The SDE model can easily generate synthesized
sample paths whose entropy measure is consistent with the original measurement
data. The SDE model is a more general modeling framework that can be used to
129
obtain an N -state Markov model. While we show that the 2-state GE model is
a good choice when binary representation of the channel condition is sufficient, the
SDE model is in general much more accurate and easier to use than an N -state model.
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CHAPTER VI
Trading Secondary Spectrum Through Spectrum
Portfolio
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter II and III, the buyer only considers purchasing one type of secondary
spectrum product and the rest from the reference market to satisfy the transmission
quality constraint. When multiple secondary spectrum products are available on the
market, the buyer may be able to combine multiple purchases of stochastic spectrum
products to increase the quality of transmission. In this chapter, we consider a buyer
who purchases a portfolio of spectrum products to maximize the mean throughput
while minimizing the variation of transmission throughput. The buyer’s consideration
will rely on the understanding of the channel statistics and the channel statistics can
change when more information of the channel is gathered. A precise channel dynamics
model will be important for the buyer and seller to have good purchase and pricing
plans.
6.2 Model
In this section we describe in detail the models for the two parties under the
framework: the seller and the buyer, and their considerations in designing and choos-
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ing the purchase, respectively. The basic idea underlying our model is that the buyer
purchases a mixture of secondary spectrum products, which are random and non-
guaranteed. By a careful selection of the different secondary spectrum products,
the buyer minimizes the variation of the service by considering the statistics of each
spectrum product. Another important idea is the reference spectrum which provides
guaranteed spectrum product, this gives the buyer an alternative if the secondary
spectrum products are all undesirable or overpriced.
6.2.1 The Seller
There are two parties, the seller and the buyer. The seller who uses the spectrum
to provide business and service to its primary users, and carry primary traffic. The
seller is willing to sell underutilized bandwidth as long as it generates positive profit
and does not impact negatively it’s primary business. We will assume that the seller
has N types of spectrum products each running a different primary service. Based on
the primary services running on each type of spectrum, the throughput obtained by
the buyer is different. The seller measures the statistics of each channel and announces
the measurements; in this case we will primarily consider the first and second order
statistics of the throughput (the mean and the variance of throughput).
The seller can decide a price corresponding to each type of spectrum product,
the goal is to obtained as much profit as possible from the secondary market. The
seller has to design the prices carefully, let the vector C = [C1...CN ] denote the
price vector of the spectrum and G = [G1...GN ] denote the mean throughput of the
spectrum. Σ denotes the correlation matrix of the N spectrum products in terms of
their throughputs. We will assume that the throughput obtained from the spectrum
products are independent random variables so Σ would be a diagonal matrix. The
analysis in this chapter is not necessarily limited to this independent assumption and
we will mention when it can be applied to dependent spectrum setups.
132
6.2.2 The Buyer
The buyer purchases a portfolio of different secondary spectrum products for it’s
own use. The buyer has a fixed amount of money and wants to maximize the mean
throughput while minimizing the variation of the throughput obtained from the spec-
trum products. Assume the random variable X denotes the throughput of the sum
throughput of the spectrum portfolio purchased. The utility of the buyer is captured
by the following expression:
maxE[X]− ηV ar[X],
where η represents the risk the buyer is willing to take. For risk averse buyer, η will be
a large number. For a risk neutral buyer, η would be 0 and the buyer only cares about
maximizing expected throughput. Let the vector P = [P1...PN ] denote the amount
of each channel purchased by the buyer. Then E[X] = PTG and V ar[X] = PTΣP.
The budget constraint of the buyer is denoted by a scalar t. We assume the buyer
will spend all of the money so that PTC = t.
6.2.3 Reference Spectrum
We include a reference spectrum market as a third party to the buyer and seller.
The buyer can choose any portion of the budget t to purchase from the reference
market and spend the rest in the secondary market. The spectrum bought from
the reference market is assumed to have exclusive access right and will generate a
fixed amount of throughput with 0 variance. The reference spectrum only serves as
a comparison to find the fair price of the secondary spectrum, thus, we normalize it
to unit price per bandwidth.
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6.3 Analysis
We first consider the problem where the buyer only purchases from the secondary
spectrum market given prices set by the seller. Based on the result, we find the
optimal portion that the buyer will put into the secondary spectrum market, which
allows us to derive the pricing strategy of the seller.
6.3.1 Buyer’s consideration without the reference channel
The buyer’s consideration can be written as an optimization problem over the




subject to PTC = t (6.2)
Pi ≥ 0, (6.3)
where each Pi has to be nonnegative. If we first ignore the inequality constraint, the








If there are entries less than zero, the solution can be obtained by iterative elimination
of entries less than zero then reapplying Equation 6.4 [53]. The channels that are left
un-eliminated depends on the amount of money t the buyer wants to purchase. Note
that the iterative elimination process does not require the spectrum products being
independent.
134
6.3.2 Buyer’s consideration with the reference channel
We now include the reference market, which sells guaranteed spectrum with price
1 and 1 unit power per bandwidth in the buyer’s problem. Consider that the buyer
uses a portion of t − t0 to invest in the reference market. The buyer’s problem
is to choose the optimal amount between the reference market and the secondary
market. Now we will assume that the channels have independent quality and the
covariance matrix is a diagonal matrix. In this case, Σ−1 is a diagonal matrix with
diagonal entries being the inverse of each variance and are nonnegative. The entry Pi
is negative only if Gi−Ci(ηt0−CTΣ−1GCTΣ−1C ) is negative. Note that because this expression
is increasing in t0, the channels uneliminated will not be eliminated when we increase
t0. The buyer’s problem can be expressed as the following maximization problem
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If t0 > t, the buyer will invest all money t in the secondary spectrum market and
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the iterative elimination process Equation 6.4 will determine the optimal portfolio.
If t0 ≤ t, the buyer will only invest t0 in the secondary spectrum market and the
remaining t − t0 will be invested in the reference market. Note that in the latter
case, the money PiCi invested in each spectrum product be at the value such that
the marginal gain of investing in the ith product equal to the gain of investing in the
reference market. In this case, the choices for each spectrum product are decoupled
and are only compared with the price of the reference spectrum. We will see this in the
next section where the pricing of each spectrum product can be decided independently.
6.3.3 Optimal pricing for the seller
We assume the primary knows the buyer’s preference and wants to maximize total
revenue obtained from the buyer. Because t0 is exactly the amount the buyer spends
in the secondary market, the seller wants to maximize t0 with the choice of C. (The






Because Σ is a diagonal matrix, the amount each spectrum product contributed to
the seller’s revenue is additive and does not depend on the other spectrum products.
In order to maximize the revenue, the seller will set the price such that all products
are not eliminated from the buyers choice. The maximum choice is C = G/2 where
the total revenue is G
TΣ−1G
8η
. We substitute this result into the buyer’s consideration
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This says that if the seller designs the price of each channel proportional to the mean
throughput, the buyer will have an incentive to purchase non-zero amount of each
secondary spectrum product.
6.3.4 Optimal pricing for seller with channel cost
If the primary has a cost per bandwidth for each channel C¯, then the maximum
profit can be expressed as.
max
C






















CTΣ−1CCTΣ(G−C + C¯)− 2CTΣCGTΣC¯ + CTΣC¯CTΣG
2ηCTΣ−1C
This expression is non-convex and t0 depends on the design of C. Assuming that the
cost C¯ = aG is a fraction of the mean G and the seller designs C = bG. Then we
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can simplify the problem to,
max
b










−b2 + (1 + a)b− a
2η
GTΣ−1G (6.19)
Since C = bG, the buyer will purchase from all channels. Under the assumption, the
optimal pricing plan is C = 1+a
2





. As one would
expect, the profit is higher with low cost (small a), small η, large G (high channel
mean throughput) and small Σ (good quality spectrum).
6.4 Simulation
In this section, we test the resulting throughput of the buyer’s portfolio derived
in this chapter. The seller has 10 channels each modeled by an independent Gaussian
random variable with mean (µ = 144) ± 50% and standard deviation 15 ± 50%
uniformly generated. The price per channel is set to 90 ± 10% of the channel mean
throughput. The buyer is assumed to have 100 units of money, which can purchase
111 units of throughput from the secondary market on average. The reference market
is set at 1 unit price per bandwidth so the buyer can get 100 units of throughput at
0 variation. The parameter η is set to 1 in this particular case.
In Fig. 6.1 we show the throughput obtained by the portfolio optimization pro-
posed in this chapter compared with an uniform purchasing of each channel. As
shown in Fig. 6.1, the throughput bought from the portfolio has a smaller variation
compared with the uniform purchasing. The variance of the portfolio method obtains
a mean 117 and standard deviation 1.37 while the uniform purchase obtains mean 113
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Figure 6.1: Independent Gaussian random variables
and standard deviation 4.2. This shows that the portfolio method effectively reduces
the risk.





















Figure 6.2: Mean throughput for different η
Next, we plot the mean and variance of the obtained throughput over different
values of η = [0, 8]. The results are shown in Figure 6.2 and 6.3. We can see that with
small η, the portfolio acquires more throughput because the variance term is weighted
with a small value. However, the standard deviation of the portfolio is very high. This
would be the case when the buyer only cares about the expected throughput. On the
other hand, when η = 8, the average throughput is low and the standard deviation is
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also very close to zero. This would be the case of a risk averse buyer.






















Figure 6.3: Throughput variance for different η
















Figure 6.4: Seller’s profit for different η
We also test the efficiency of the proposed pricing plan for the seller. For indepen-
dent channels, the optimal price of each channel is C = G/2. We keep the simulation
setups the same, but set C = G/2. We compare the result with an uniform price
setting Ci = µ/2 = 72 shown in Figure 6.4. When η is low, the buyer will prefer to
spend all the money in the secondary market because the prices are lower. Thus, both
pricing plans receive 100% of the buyer’s money. When η is high, we can see that




Prospect theory [44, 67, 45] is a method to describe the way people choose between
probabilistic alternatives that involve risk. In particular, individuals decide which
outcomes they consider equivalent, set a reference point and then consider lesser
outcomes as losses and greater ones as gains. We use the prospect theory utility
function to model the risk-averse buyer. To be more precise, let x be the value
compared to the reference point a common utility function is as follows,
v(x) =
 x
β x ≥ 0
λ(−x)β x < 0
(6.20)
The utility changes most rapidly around the reference point which the person con-
siders the normal outcome. In our problem, we consider investing all money in the
reference market as the reference point. Spending 100 will result in guaranteed 100
throughput, thus, the gain (or loss) is x = X − 100. We let β = 0.5 and vary λ from
1 to 4. (higher λ means the buyer is more loss averse)


















Figure 6.5: Buyer’s utility for different λ
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Figure 6.5 shows the result. Because the channel set selected by the proposed
portfolio method has a smaller standard deviation, it performs consistently regardless
of how bad the buyer considers the loss. On the contrary, a uniform channel selection
would have lower utility when λ is increased.
6.4.2 Dynamic Spectrum Access
Lastly, we apply the portfolio selection method to a dynamic channel model. We
use the stochastic differential equation (SDE) model developed in Chapter V, where
the SDE channel statisitcs of the next state depends on the current channel observa-
tion. The SDE model can be discretized to discrete time slots and each SDE channel is
driven by an independent Brownian motion. Based on the channel condition and the
price of each channel, the user can optimize the allocation power on these channels to
get a higher combination of throughput. We will fix the price to the optimal pricing
C = G/2. In particular use a SDE model with µ = 144± 20%, b = 1.26e+ 07± 20%
and σ = 93± 20%.
















Figure 6.6: SDE channels
The results are shown in Figure 6.6. We compare the proposed portfolio method
with an uniform allocation on all channels. As shown in Figure 6.6, the proposed
portfolio method obtains a combined throughput with smaller variation compared to
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the uniform channel selection.
6.5 Related Work
The work in this chapter uses the Sharpe ratio metric [2] for the buyer’s consid-
eration problem. The mean-variance based analysis is often used in finance because
the variance of return is as important as the mean returns [62]. Work most related
to that presented here includes [71] where the authors considered the QoS manage-
ment in cognitive radio using portfolio selection theory. The main difference is that
we include the pricing of channel products in the secondary users’ consideration and
include a reference market which sells guaranteed spectrum. We also consider the
optimal pricing plans for the primary user. In [57], Muthuswamy et. al. consid-
ered two different metrics, the demand satisfaction rate constraint and the demand
satisfaction probability constraint for the buyer’s objective (we borrowed these two
metrics as the expected loss and probability of loss constraint considered in Chapter
II and III). The authors showed that the buyer’s objective is a convex problem which
can be solved numerically.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider the buyer’s problem of combining multiple secondary
spectrum to obtained more stable transmission. The buyer maximizes a combina-
tion of mean throughput and negative of throughput variance. We solve the buyer’s
optimization problem with and without the reference market. Base on the result of
the buyer’s consideration, we find the optimal pricing plan for the seller if the seller
maximizes total revenue. If the seller has a cost per channel, we find the optimal





In this dissertation, we studied the pricing and sensing issues that arise in as-
sociation with concepts such as dynamic spectrum access/sharing, open access, and
secondary (spot or short-term) spectrum markets. For the pricing issue we proposed
a contract design framework, and then studied two related problems: portfolio design
and oligopoly market. For the sensing issue we proposed a spectrum utilization model
which uses stochastic differential equations.
Specifically, we first formulate a contract design problem where a primary license
holder wishes to profit from its excess spectrum capacity by selling it to potential
secondary users. It needs to determine how to optimally price the excess spectrum
so as to maximize its profit, knowing that this excess capacity is stochastic in na-
ture and cannot provide deterministic service guarantees to a buyer. We adopt as a
reference a traditional spectrum market where the buyer can purchase exclusive ac-
cess with fixed/deterministic guarantees. The model captures the following essential
features: (1) excess bandwidth on the secondary spectrum market often comes with
non-exclusive use and therefore highly uncertain channel conditions; (2) incentives
are built in for both the seller and the buyer to conduct spectrum trading on the
secondary market. We fully characterize the optimal set of contracts the seller should
provide in the case of a single buyer. When there are multiple types of buyers and
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each experiences different channel conditions, we construct a computationally efficient
algorithm and show that the set of contracts it generates is optimal when the buyer
types satisfy a monotonicity condition.
When multiple primary holders exist, we formulate a price competition model for
the primary licensees selling on a secondary spectrum market. Standard results sug-
gest that under full competition the equilibrium only exists when all sellers have zero
profit. We introduce a regulator which can also be thought of as the sellers forming a
coalition, whose role is to enable money transfer based on partial observations of the
sellers’ actions. We show that by proper design of the transfer mechanism, efficient
equilibrium (profit-maximizing) can be achieved.
For the sensing issue, we propose a spectrum utilization model which uses stochas-
tic differential equations (SDE) to model dynamic scattering and multipath fading
channels, in particular, Rayleigh-distributed stationary channels. The SDE model
is in closed form, can generate spectrum dynamics as a temporal process, and is
shown to provide very good fit for real spectrum measurement data. We use real
data collected from spectrum measurement studies to verify the SDE model and it is
shown to fit the data very well. By using this model we can synthesize sample paths
(temporal power process) of a wireless channel, thereby creating a realistic spectrum
environment which can be used for simulation studies. The SDE model can be used to
generate the 2-state Markov (GE) model (and also can generate an N -state Markov
models) through time-discretization and value-quantization. This SDE-generated GE
model also matches closely the GE model generated directly from the quantized data.
Therefore the SDE model may be viewed as a continuous generalization of the discrete
GE model (and more broadly a discrete N -state model), and while the former can be
used to obtain the latter the reverse is not true. The SDE model is defined by only 3
parameters and is thus very easy and inexpensive to train with much less data com-
pared to a discrete N -state model. It is also much more robust to imperfections in the
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data, e.g., when samples are not exactly collected at constant intervals. Furthermore,
once the SDE model is trained, it can be used to at any desired time resolution due
to its continuous-time nature, whereas an N -state Markov model would need to be
retrained if one wants to reduce the size of the discrete time step (i.e., increase the
time resolution).
Next, we consider the problem where the buyer purchases a portfolio of secondary
spectrum services. By combining multiple secondary spectrum purchases with dif-
ferent randomness, the quality of transmission over the combined spectrum can be
improved. The seller has a number of different spectrum channels each running its
own primary service. Based on the different services, each channel has different
quality measures when sold the secondary user. The seller can decide the price per
bandwidth of each channel. The buyer’s utility metric is a combination of mean
throughput weighted with throughput variance of the portfolio purchased. We again
use a reference market that sells guaranteed service to the buyer, with which a buyer
can compute its optimal portfolio. Based on the knowledge of the buyer’s optimal
portfolio selection, we show how to calculate the optimal pricing for each secondary
spectrum channel.
In Chapter V, we developed an accurate model for describing the usage of primary
users viewed by the secondaries in the same channel. To connect pricing with the
sensing model, we used the SDE model in Chapter VI for the channel condition in
testing the performance of the channel portfolio selection as a spectrum access policy.
It would be interesting to see how the incentives of the secondary users are affected
if we replace the binary/uniform random variable models we used in Chapter II-III
with the SDE model. The SDE model can be used in different forms that are suitable
for different needs. One approach would be using it directly in the continuous time
continuous valued form. If the stochastic differential equation is too hard to analyze
in the differential form, the other approach would be to use the N-state Markov model
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derived from the SDE. The Markov model is easier to analyze and inheres the same
characteristics for state evolution of the SDE model.
Describing the incentives of the secondary user will require the channel access
policies used by the user because we need to know the policy in order to estimate the
utility obtained by the user. The SDE model has the Markovian property because
knowing the current state, the next time step of the channel does not depend on
the previous states of the channel. Thus, we know that there exists a state based
strategy that is optimal. If we could find the optimal channel access policy, we can
better estimate the throughput/utility obtained by the secondary user in the SDE
model. Then, the incentive studies of the secondary user in the SDE model would be
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